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secrets-rotation-kms

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✗ failed GOOD_FAILURE ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
GOOD_FAILUREHonest miss, the agent ran correctly but couldn't solve it. Expected for a hard task; the task is sound.
SubtypeIncomplete Solution - Missing Layer
EvidenceTest `test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role` FAILED (line 13-56 of test-stdout.txt). Agent fixed: (1) finish_secret handler, (2) verified IAM role KMS permissions, (3) added Lambda resource policy. Agent failed to: (4) update the KMS CMK key policy to include an explicit Allow statement granting kms:Decrypt and kms:GenerateDataKey to the secrets-rotator role principal. The key policy still only contains the EnableRootAdmin statement with Action 'kms:*' and Resource '*'. The task.toml difficulty_explanation explicitly states: 'Four layers must all align... LLMs typically fix the role's identity policy and stop.'
Root causeThe agent successfully diagnosed and fixed three of four required layers but did not complete the fix by updating the KMS key policy to explicitly grant the Lambda role access. This is a hard, multi-layered task that requires understanding all four policy/permission layers must be configured correctly, and the agent stopped prematurely after addressing only three.
RecommendationN/A - task is fine. The task is well-specified and intentionally tests whether agents can navigate a complex multi-layer AWS permissions problem. The instruction and task.toml setup explicitly document the four broken layers. The agent made good progress but failed to complete all four fixes needed to pass verification. This is expected failure for a hard task.
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
19 tool calls · 5 tool types · 26 steps
# Make AWS Secrets Manager rotation actually rotate You are working against a LocalStack AWS endpoint at `http://localstack:4566`. The container already has `aws` (AWS CLI v2), `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`, `zip`, and `curl` installed. `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test`, and `AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1` are already exported. The environment has been pre-seeded by `/app/setup.sh` with a **partially-deployed, broken-by-design** Secrets Manager rotation setup. You must diagnose what's wrong and make rotation actually advance the secret to a new value. ## Starter resources Every resource below already exists , do not rename or recreate unless you know what you're doing: - **Secret**: `app/db/password`, encrypted with a customer-managed CMK - **KMS CMK**: alias `alias/app-rotation-key` (symmetric ENCRYPT_DECRYPT) - **Rotation Lambda**: function `secrets-rotator`, runtime `python3.11`, source on disk at `/app/handler.py` - **IAM role**: `secrets-rotator-role` (inline policy `SecretsRotatorPolicy`) with the Lambda's execution permissions - **Rotation config** is already attached to the secret (pointing at the rotation Lambda), but invoking it fails , the layers needed to actually carry out the rotation are broken. ## Required outcome After your fix, running ```bash aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password ``` must: 1. **Succeed without error.** 2. **Advance `AWSCURRENT`** to a fresh version ID , the version that holds the `AWSCURRENT` label after rotation must be different from the version that held it before, and the string value returned by `get-secret-value` must change. 3. **Label the prior version as `AWSPREVIOUS`.** The verifier inspects both the end-to-end behaviour and the shape of the underlying IAM / KMS / Lambda configuration. Least privilege matters , the grader reads policy documents directly. The rotation Lambda source lives at `/app/handler.py`; redeploy with `aws lambda update-function-code --zip-file fileb://...`. LocalStack spawns Lambda containers on the shared compose network, so `http://localstack:4566` is reachable from inside the function.

List app directory contents

shell
ls -la /app/
output
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:10 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:12 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4137 Apr 22 19:10 handler.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 6097 Apr 22 19:10 setup.sh
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:10 starter

[stdout]
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:10 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:12 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4137 Apr 22 19:10 handler.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 6097 Apr 22 19:10 setup.sh
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 22 19:10 starter

/app/setup.sh

contents
1	#!/bin/bash
2	# Seeds LocalStack with the broken-by-design state the agent inherits:
3	#   - customer-managed KMS CMK (alias alias/app-rotation-key)
4	#   - Secrets Manager secret encrypted with that CMK
5	#   - IAM role for the rotation Lambda (with deliberately incomplete policy)
6	#   - Rotation Lambda (with a subtle bug in finishSecret)
7	#   - Rotation configured on the secret, pointing at the Lambda
8	#
9	# The task expects these resources to already exist when the agent starts
10	# working. The agent must find the bugs and make `rotate-secret` actually
11	# advance AWSCURRENT end-to-end.
12	
13	set -euo pipefail
14	
15	REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
16	ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"
17	SECRET_NAME="app/db/password"
18	ROLE_NAME="secrets-rotator-role"
19	FUNCTION="secrets-rotator"
20	KEY_ALIAS="alias/app-rotation-key"
21	
22	log() { echo "[setup] $*" >&2; }
23	
24	log "waiting for localstack health..."
25	for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
26	  if curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | grep -q '"secretsmanager": "available"'; then
27	    break
28	  fi
29	  sleep 2
30	done
31	
32	# 1. CMK with a minimal key policy (root admin only , no grant for the
33	#    rotation Lambda role yet).
34	log "creating KMS CMK"
35	KEY_POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
36	{
37	  "Version": "2012-10-17",
38	  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
39	  "Statement": [
40	    {
41	      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
42	      "Effect": "Allow",
43	      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root" },
44	      "Action": "kms:*",
45	      "Resource": "*"
46	    }
47	  ]
48	}
49	JSON
50	)
51	KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key \
52	  --description "Customer CMK for app/db/password" \
53	  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
54	  --policy "$KEY_POLICY" \
55	  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
56	aws kms create-alias --alias-name "$KEY_ALIAS" --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" >/dev/null
57	KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"
58	log "created CMK $KEY_ID"
59	
60	# 2. Secret, encrypted with the CMK.
61	log "creating secret"
62	aws secretsmanager create-secret \
63	  --name "$SECRET_NAME" \
64	  --kms-key-id "$KEY_ARN" \
65	  --secret-string '{"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}' \
66	  --description "App DB password, rotated by Lambda" >/dev/null
67	
68	SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
69	  --query 'ARN' --output text)
70	log "created secret $SECRET_ARN"
71	
72	# 3. IAM role for the rotation Lambda. Deliberately incomplete , has
73	#    secretsmanager:* but no KMS actions. The broken state the agent
74	#    inherits.
75	log "creating rotation Lambda role"
76	TRUST=$(cat <<'JSON'
77	{
78	  "Version": "2012-10-17",
79	  "Statement": [
80	    {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"}, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"}
81	  ]
82	}
83	JSON
84	)
85	aws iam create-role \
86	  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
87	  --assume-role-policy-document "$TRUST" >/dev/null
88	
89	aws iam attach-role-policy \
90	  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
91	  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole
92	
93	INLINE=$(cat <<JSON
94	{
95	  "Version": "2012-10-17",
96	  "Statement": [
97	    {
98	      "Effect": "Allow",
99	      "Action": [
100	        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
101	        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
102	        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
103	        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
104	      ],
105	      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
106	    },
107	    {
108	      "Effect": "Allow",
109	      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
110	      "Resource": "*"
111	    }
112	  ]
113	}
114	JSON
115	)
116	aws iam put-role-policy \
117	  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
118	  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
119	  --policy-document "$INLINE"
120	
121	ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
122	log "created role $ROLE_ARN"
123	
124	# 4. Package + deploy the rotation Lambda (with its buggy handler).
125	log "packaging rotation Lambda"
126	WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
127	cp /app/handler.py "${WORKDIR}/handler.py"
128	(cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py)
129	
130	aws lambda create-function \
131	  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
132	  --runtime python3.11 \
133	  --role "$ROLE_ARN" \
134	  --handler handler.lambda_handler \
135	  --timeout 30 \
136	  --memory-size 256 \
137	  --environment "Variables={SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566}" \
138	  --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null
139	
140	for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
141	  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
142	    --query 'Configuration.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo "Pending")
143	  [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break
144	  sleep 1
145	done
146	log "Lambda $FUNCTION active"
147	
148	# NOTE: deliberately NOT calling `aws lambda add-permission` with
149	# principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com. The agent must add that.
150	
151	# 5. Attach rotation config on the secret. Secrets Manager refuses to
152	#    attach unless the rotation Lambda already grants it InvokeFunction,
153	#    so we temporarily add that permission, attach rotation, then remove
154	#    the permission so the agent still has to re-add it as part of their
155	#    fix. Net result: RotationEnabled=true but rotation fails at runtime
156	#    because of the other broken layers (KMS grants, handler bug, Lambda
157	#    resource policy).
158	log "attaching rotation config (temp Lambda permission)"
159	FUNCTION_ARN="arn:aws:lambda:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:function:${FUNCTION}"
160	aws lambda add-permission \
161	  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
162	  --statement-id TempRotationSetup \
163	  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
164	  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
165	  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
166	
167	if aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
168	     --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
169	     --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
170	     --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 \
171	     --no-rotate-immediately >/dev/null 2>&1; then
172	  log "rotation attached (no immediate trigger)"
173	elif aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
174	       --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
175	       --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
176	       --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
177	  log "rotation attached (first run may have fired)"
178	else
179	  log "rotate-secret failed even with temp permission , check LocalStack compat"
180	fi
181	
182	# Strip the temp permission so the agent still has to add it.
183	aws lambda remove-permission \
184	  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
185	  --statement-id TempRotationSetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
186	
187	log "done"
188

/app/handler.py

contents
1	# Rotation Lambda for AWS Secrets Manager, "single-user" pattern
2	# (no external database, value is self-contained).
3	#
4	# Secrets Manager calls this function 4 times in sequence per rotation,
5	# passing a Step field: createSecret, setSecret, testSecret, finishSecret.
6	# Each step must return cleanly for the rotation to advance.
7	#
8	# Reference:
9	#   https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/rotate-secrets_lambda-functions.html
10	
11	import json
12	import logging
13	import os
14	
15	import boto3
16	
17	logger = logging.getLogger()
18	logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
19	
20	ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT") or os.environ.get(
21	    "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL"
22	)
23	
24	
25	def _client():
26	    return boto3.client("secretsmanager", endpoint_url=ENDPOINT) if ENDPOINT else boto3.client("secretsmanager")
27	
28	
29	def lambda_handler(event, context):
30	    arn = event["SecretId"]
31	    token = event["ClientRequestToken"]
32	    step = event["Step"]
33	
34	    client = _client()
35	
36	    desc = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
37	    if not desc.get("RotationEnabled"):
38	        logger.error("Secret %s is not enabled for rotation", arn)
39	        raise ValueError(f"Secret {arn} is not enabled for rotation")
40	
41	    versions = desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {})
42	    if token not in versions:
43	        logger.error("Secret version %s has no stage for rotation of %s", token, arn)
44	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} has no stage for rotation of secret {arn}")
45	    if "AWSCURRENT" in versions[token]:
46	        logger.info("Secret version %s already AWSCURRENT for %s", token, arn)
47	        return
48	    if "AWSPENDING" not in versions[token]:
49	        logger.error("Secret version %s not staged as AWSPENDING for %s", token, arn)
50	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} not set as AWSPENDING for rotation of secret {arn}")
51	
52	    if step == "createSecret":
53	        create_secret(client, arn, token)
54	    elif step == "setSecret":
55	        set_secret(client, arn, token)
56	    elif step == "testSecret":
57	        test_secret(client, arn, token)
58	    elif step == "finishSecret":
59	        finish_secret(client, arn, token)
60	    else:
61	        raise ValueError(f"Invalid step parameter: {step}")
62	
63	
64	def create_secret(client, arn, token):
65	    # Generate a new candidate value and stash it as AWSPENDING.
66	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
67	
68	    try:
69	        client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
70	        logger.info("createSecret: pending version %s already exists", token)
71	    except client.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
72	        password = client.get_random_password(PasswordLength=32, ExcludePunctuation=True)
73	        client.put_secret_value(
74	            SecretId=arn,
75	            ClientRequestToken=token,
76	            SecretString=json.dumps({"password": password["RandomPassword"]}),
77	            VersionStages=["AWSPENDING"],
78	        )
79	        logger.info("createSecret: stored new AWSPENDING version %s", token)
80	
81	
82	def set_secret(client, arn, token):
83	    # No external system to update for a self-contained secret; validate
84	    # that both AWSCURRENT and AWSPENDING are readable and move on.
85	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
86	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
87	    logger.info("setSecret: both stages readable")
88	
89	
90	def test_secret(client, arn, token):
91	    # Sanity-check the pending value parses as JSON with a non-empty
92	    # password field. Real handlers would attempt a login here.
93	    pending = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
94	    parsed = json.loads(pending["SecretString"])
95	    if not parsed.get("password"):
96	        raise ValueError("testSecret: pending value has no password")
97	    logger.info("testSecret: pending value validated")
98	
99	
100	def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
101	    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
102	    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
103	    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
104	    # consumers keep reading the old password.
105	    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
106

Describe secret

shell
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password 2>&1 | head -60
output
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/705dc826-67b1-4bb1-b210-c2789e748f66",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:27+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:24.344000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:12:22+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:14.295431+00:00"
}

[stdout]
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/705dc826-67b1-4bb1-b210-c2789e748f66",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:27+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:24.344000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:12:22+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:12:14.295431+00:00"
}

Try rotation to see what fails

shell
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password 2>&1
output
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636"
}

[stdout]
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636"
}

Check state after rotate

shell
sleep 3; aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password 2>&1 | jq '.VersionIdsToStages'; echo "---"; aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password | jq '.SecretString, .VersionId'
output
{
  "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ],
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPENDING"
  ]
}
---
"{\"password\": \"initial-placeholder-value\"}"
"d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83"

[stdout]
{
  "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ],
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPENDING"
  ]
}
---
"{\"password\": \"initial-placeholder-value\"}"
"d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83"
Now I understand the state. Let me diagnose all the broken layers: 1. **`finish_secret` is a no-op** , AWSCURRENT never advances 2. **IAM role has no KMS actions** , Lambda can't encrypt/decrypt the CMK-encrypted secret 3. **Lambda lacks resource policy** for `secretsmanager.amazonaws.com:InvokeFunction` 4. **KMS key policy** only has root admin (adequate for in-account IAM delegation, but should still verify) Let me check the IAM policy and confirm:

Check current IAM and Lambda policy

shell
aws iam get-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy 2>&1; echo "---"; aws lambda get-policy --function-name secrets-rotator 2>&1
output
Exit code 254
{
    "RoleName": "secrets-rotator-role",
    "PolicyName": "SecretsRotatorPolicy",
    "PolicyDocument": {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                    "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
                "Resource": "*"
            }
        ]
    }
}
---

aws: [ERROR]: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

Additional error details:
Type: User

[error] tool reported failure
Confirmed all four issues. Fixing them now. **Fix 1: `finish_secret` in handler.py**

/app/handler.py

− removed
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
    # consumers keep reading the old password.
    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
+ added
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    meta = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
    current_version = None
    for version_id, stages in meta["VersionIdsToStages"].items():
        if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
            if version_id == token:
                logger.info("finishSecret: version %s already AWSCURRENT", token)
                return
            current_version = version_id
            break

    client.update_secret_version_stage(
        SecretId=arn,
        VersionStage="AWSCURRENT",
        MoveToVersionId=token,
        RemoveFromVersionId=current_version,
    )
    logger.info("finishSecret: promoted %s to AWSCURRENT (was %s)", token, current_version)
ToolSearch
{
  "query": "select:TodoWrite",
  "max_results": 1
}

, output, 
{"type": "tool_reference", "tool_name": "TodoWrite"}
  • Fix finish_secret and redeploy Lambda
  • Add lambda:InvokeFunction permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com
  • Grant KMS Decrypt/GenerateDataKey to rotator role
  • Verify rotation advances AWSCURRENT and AWSPREVIOUS is set

Repackage and redeploy Lambda

shell
WORKDIR=$(mktemp -d) && cp /app/handler.py "$WORKDIR/handler.py" && (cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py) && aws lambda update-function-code --function-name secrets-rotator --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null && echo "updated"; for _ in $(seq 1 30); do STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name secrets-rotator --query 'Configuration.LastUpdateStatus' --output text 2>/dev/null); [ "$STATE" = "Successful" ] && break; sleep 1; done; echo "state=$STATE"
output
updated
state=Successful

[stdout]
updated
state=Successful
  • Fix finish_secret and redeploy Lambda
  • Add lambda:InvokeFunction permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com
  • Grant KMS Decrypt/GenerateDataKey to rotator role
  • Verify rotation advances AWSCURRENT and AWSPREVIOUS is set

Add Lambda resource policy for Secrets Manager

shell
SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'ARN' --output text); aws lambda add-permission --function-name secrets-rotator --statement-id SecretsManagerRotationInvoke --action lambda:InvokeFunction --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" 2>&1
output
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerRotationInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn\"}}}"
}

[stdout]
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerRotationInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn\"}}}"
}
  • Fix finish_secret and redeploy Lambda
  • Add lambda:InvokeFunction permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com
  • Grant KMS Decrypt/GenerateDataKey to rotator role
  • Verify rotation advances AWSCURRENT and AWSPREVIOUS is set
**Fix 3: Add scoped KMS permissions to rotator role**

Update inline IAM policy with scoped KMS actions

shell
SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'ARN' --output text); KEY_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'KmsKeyId' --output text); echo "SECRET=$SECRET_ARN"; echo "KEY=$KEY_ARN"; POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "kms:ViaService": "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
JSON
); aws iam put-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy --policy-document "$POLICY" && echo "updated inline policy"
output
SECRET=arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn
KEY=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/705dc826-67b1-4bb1-b210-c2789e748f66
updated inline policy

[stdout]
SECRET=arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn
KEY=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/705dc826-67b1-4bb1-b210-c2789e748f66
updated inline policy
  • Fix finish_secret and redeploy Lambda
  • Add lambda:InvokeFunction permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com
  • Grant KMS Decrypt/GenerateDataKey to rotator role
  • Verify rotation advances AWSCURRENT and AWSPREVIOUS is set
Now verify the end-to-end rotation works.

Run rotation and verify AWSCURRENT advances

shell
BEFORE=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password); BEFORE_ID=$(echo "$BEFORE" | jq -r .VersionId); BEFORE_VAL=$(echo "$BEFORE" | jq -r .SecretString); echo "BEFORE VersionId=$BEFORE_ID"; echo "BEFORE SecretString=$BEFORE_VAL"; echo "---"; echo "rotating..."; aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password; echo "---"; for i in $(seq 1 30); do sleep 2; AFTER=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password); AFTER_ID=$(echo "$AFTER" | jq -r .VersionId); if [ "$AFTER_ID" != "$BEFORE_ID" ]; then echo "Advanced after ${i} polls"; break; fi; done; echo "---"; echo "AFTER VersionId=$AFTER_ID"; echo "AFTER SecretString=$(echo "$AFTER" | jq -r .SecretString)"; echo "---"; aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password | jq '.VersionIdsToStages'
output
BEFORE VersionId=d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83
BEFORE SecretString={"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}
---
rotating...
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636"
}
---
Advanced after 1 polls
---
AFTER VersionId=4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636
AFTER SecretString={"password": "1C8viNnYvDoOUOznBEYHL0cSAIbG7sH7"}
---
{
  "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
    "AWSPREVIOUS"
  ],
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPENDING",
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ]
}

[stdout]
BEFORE VersionId=d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83
BEFORE SecretString={"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}
---
rotating...
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636"
}
---
Advanced after 1 polls
---
AFTER VersionId=4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636
AFTER SecretString={"password": "1C8viNnYvDoOUOznBEYHL0cSAIbG7sH7"}
---
{
  "d0336814-de43-4984-b456-ca8669023f83": [
    "AWSPREVIOUS"
  ],
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPENDING",
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ]
}
Rotation worked. Let me run another cycle to confirm it's repeatable.

Run another rotation cycle

shell
BEFORE=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password); BEFORE_ID=$(echo "$BEFORE" | jq -r .VersionId); echo "BEFORE VersionId=$BEFORE_ID"; aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password; for i in $(seq 1 30); do sleep 2; AFTER_ID=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password | jq -r .VersionId); [ "$AFTER_ID" != "$BEFORE_ID" ] && echo "Advanced after ${i} polls" && break; done; echo "AFTER VersionId=$AFTER_ID"; aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password | jq '.VersionIdsToStages'; echo "---"; aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password | jq -r .SecretString
output
BEFORE VersionId=4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb"
}
Advanced after 1 polls
AFTER VersionId=1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb
{
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPREVIOUS"
  ],
  "1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb": [
    "AWSPENDING",
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ]
}
---
{"password": "0sEdi8Y9WRhfmlRYH1aZFK1ScwJMlhJ3"}

[stdout]
BEFORE VersionId=4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-fsHWVn",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb"
}
Advanced after 1 polls
AFTER VersionId=1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb
{
  "4d0c8e20-34ab-4350-a1b9-c0cb566e6636": [
    "AWSPREVIOUS"
  ],
  "1d89aad9-8322-4a85-9ba1-2478650bfdbb": [
    "AWSPENDING",
    "AWSCURRENT"
  ]
}
---
{"password": "0sEdi8Y9WRhfmlRYH1aZFK1ScwJMlhJ3"}
  • Fix finish_secret and redeploy Lambda
  • Add lambda:InvokeFunction permission for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com
  • Grant KMS Decrypt/GenerateDataKey to rotator role
  • Verify rotation advances AWSCURRENT and AWSPREVIOUS is set
All three required outcomes verified: 1. **`rotate-secret` succeeds** , returns the new VersionId. 2. **AWSCURRENT advances** , version `d033…` → `4d0c…` → `1d89…` across two rotations, and `get-secret-value` returns a new random password each cycle. 3. **Prior version becomes AWSPREVIOUS** , `VersionIdsToStages` shows the old version stamped `AWSPREVIOUS` after each rotation. ### Fixes applied - **`/app/handler.py`** , `finish_secret` now calls `update_secret_version_stage` to move `AWSCURRENT` from the old version to the pending token (was a no-op). - **Lambda resource policy** , added `lambda:InvokeFunction` for `secretsmanager.amazonaws.com`, scoped to the specific secret ARN via `AWS:SourceArn`. - **`SecretsRotatorPolicy` inline policy** , added `kms:Decrypt` + `kms:GenerateDataKey` on the specific CMK ARN only, gated by `kms:ViaService = secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` so the role can't use the key outside the Secrets Manager data path. - KMS key policy left as-is (root admin already enables same-account IAM delegation).
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/gt8Le5VFrV0HTjPinmWm7/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 8 items

../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real PASSED             [ 12%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable PASSED               [ 25%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk PASSED [ 37%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists PASSED             [ 50%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions PASSED     [ 62%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role FAILED  [ 75%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke PASSED [ 87%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent PASSED  [100%]

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
____________________ test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role ____________________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffffa408c9b0>
kms = <botocore.client.KMS object at 0xffffa49d7830>

    def test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role(iam, kms):
        role_arn = iam.get_role(RoleName=ROLE_NAME)["Role"]["Arn"]
        policy_str = kms.get_key_policy(KeyId=KEY_ALIAS, PolicyName="default")["Policy"]
        policy = json.loads(policy_str)
        match = False
        for st in policy.get("Statement", []):
            if _statement_matches(
                st,
                principal_arn=role_arn,
                required_actions=REQUIRED_KMS_ACTIONS,
            ):
                match = True
                break
>       assert match, (
            f"KMS key policy on {KEY_ALIAS} has no Allow statement granting "
            f"{sorted(REQUIRED_KMS_ACTIONS)} to principal {role_arn}. Key "
            f"policy: {policy_str}"
        )
E       AssertionError: KMS key policy on alias/app-rotation-key has no Allow statement granting ['kms:Decrypt', 'kms:GenerateDataKey'] to principal arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role. Key policy: {
E           "Version": "2012-10-17",
E           "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
E           "Statement": [
E             {
E               "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
E               "Effect": "Allow",
E               "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root" },
E               "Action": "kms:*",
E               "Resource": "*"
E             }
E           ]
E         }
E       assert False

/tests/test_outputs.py:256: AssertionError
=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_outputs.py: 14 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/gt8Le5VFrV0HTjPinmWm7/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent
FAILED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role - Ass...
=================== 1 failed, 7 passed, 14 warnings in 6.50s ===================

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_2d644edb72654f28. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_2d644edb72654f28 · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.