SyncValsverifier → artifact → classifier → verdict
SyncVals · Trajectory

iam-cross-account-externalid-sourcearn

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✗ failed BAD_FAILURE ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
BAD_FAILUREThe task is at fault, underspecified/contradictory instruction, brittle/flaky tests, or tests demanding undiscoverable behavior.
SubtypeUnderspecified Instruction
EvidenceTest `test_16_kms_key_policy_has_account_root_statement` (line 31-49 of verifier output) fails expecting a Principal.AWS ending in `:root` with Action containing `kms:*`. The instruction states at line 24: 'the kms key encrypts both secrets. no `*` on kms anywhere.' This creates a direct contradiction , the instruction forbids wildcards on KMS, but the test requires the EnableIAMUserPermissions root statement with `kms:*`. The task.toml metadata (line 10) explicitly acknowledges this common failure: 'or dropping the `EnableIAMUserPermissions` root statement on the cmk's key policy after reading the instruction's 'no wildcards on KMS' guidance and over-correcting.' Agent passed 19 of 20 tests by following the literal instruction not to use wildcards on KMS.
Root causeThe instruction contains contradictory guidance: it forbids wildcards on KMS ('no `*` on kms anywhere') but the test requires the critical EnableIAMUserPermissions root statement which necessarily contains `kms:*`. A competent developer following the literal instruction would reasonably over-correct and omit this statement, causing test failure.
RecommendationClarify the KMS wildcard constraint in the instruction. Revise line 24 to explicitly state that the EnableIAMUserPermissions root statement with `kms:*` is required on the KMS key policy for AWS best practices, even though other KMS permissions should be scoped. For example: 'the kms key encrypts both secrets. use `kms:*` only in the account root's EnableIAMUserPermissions statement; all other KMS principals must have scoped permissions (no wildcards).'"
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
11 tool calls · 2 tool types · 15 steps
our security review came back ugly. an external auditor asked how we keep tenant A's orchestrator from poking at tenant B's bucket, and how we'd block a contractor from impersonating our orchestrator if they ever get hold of one of our role names. honest answer right now: we don't. the cross-account assume-role chain we have is "trust the orchestrator role arn" and that's it. they want this fixed by next sprint or we lose the SOC2 carryover. so: build the cross-account trust the way it's supposed to be done. one orchestrator role that fans out to two tenant member roles. each member role's trust must defend against TWO different attacks at the same time: 1. **third-party impersonation** , someone outside the company learns one of our member role arns and tries to assume it. fix: every assume-role call must present a per-tenant `ExternalId` shared secret. without it, denied. 2. **AWS-service confused-deputy** , some other principal in our account (or a service we've granted broadly) gets tricked into calling AssumeRole on our behalf. fix: the trust must require `aws:SourceArn` to equal the orchestrator role's arn. without it, denied. both conditions on every member role trust. not one or the other. both. shape of it: - localstack at `http://localstack:4566`. creds already exported (`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, same for secret, region `us-east-1`). `aws`, `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`. build from zero. - one **orchestrator role** trusted by an iam user that represents the orchestrator's runtime identity. - two **member roles**, one per tenant. each member role's trust policy: - principal = orchestrator role arn (specific, not `*`) - condition `StringEquals` on `sts:ExternalId` matching that tenant's secret value - condition on `aws:SourceArn` equal to the orchestrator role arn - action = `sts:AssumeRole` only , no wildcards - per-tenant **ExternalId** values stored in secrets manager, encrypted with a customer-managed kms key. the orchestrator reads the secret, doesn't hardcode it. and the two tenants get DIFFERENT ExternalIds , reusing one across tenants defeats the point. - each member role's identity policy is scoped to ONLY that tenant's bucket. tenant A's role can put/get on `tenant-a-bucket` and nothing else. no `Resource: "*"`. - the orchestrator's identity policy lists the two member role arns explicitly under `sts:AssumeRole` , no `Resource: "*"` there either. - secret access scoped: orchestrator can `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` on the two ExternalId secret arns and nothing else. - on each ExternalId secret, attach a secrets manager **resource policy** that names the orchestrator role's arn as a `Principal.AWS` for `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`. identity-side scope alone isn't enough , the secret itself must admit the orchestrator. an auditor will check both sides. - the kms key encrypts both secrets. no `*` on kms anywhere. - ssm pointers under `/harbor/...` so the verifier can find the orchestrator role arn and the secret arns without guessing. done looks like this: **happy path** , using the orchestrator's identity, get the tenant-A ExternalId from secrets manager, call `sts:AssumeRole` against `MemberRole-Tenant-A` with `--external-id <secret>`, then put an object into `tenant-a-bucket`. should succeed. **failure path (proven by shape)** , the verifier reads the trust documents directly: - both tenants' trust docs contain `Condition.StringEquals['sts:ExternalId']` matching the per-tenant secret value - both contain `Condition.{ArnLike or ArnEquals}['aws:SourceArn']` equal to the orchestrator role arn - principal is the orchestrator role arn, NOT `*` - action is exactly `sts:AssumeRole` - the two ExternalIds differ between tenants **least privilege checks** , verifier asserts: - orchestrator's identity policy enumerates the two member role arns explicitly (no wildcard assume) - orchestrator's secret-get is scoped to the two known secret arns (no wildcard) - each member role's inline policy references only its own tenant bucket arn (no `*` resource, no other tenant's bucket) - no policy has `Action: "*"` or `Resource: "*"` for s3 or kms names the verifier grabs by hand, use them exactly: | thing | name | |-|-| | iam user (orchestrator caller) | `agent-runner` | | iam user (impersonator stand-in) | `attacker-runner` | | orchestrator role | `OrchestratorRole` | | tenant-A member role | `MemberRole-Tenant-A` | | tenant-B member role | `MemberRole-Tenant-B` | | kms alias | `alias/cross-account-cmk` | | tenant-A external-id secret | `harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a` | | tenant-B external-id secret | `harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b` | | tenant-A bucket | `tenant-a-bucket` | | tenant-B bucket | `tenant-b-bucket` | | ssm orchestrator arn pointer | `/harbor/orchestrator/role-arn` | | ssm tenant-A secret arn pointer | `/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a` | | ssm tenant-B secret arn pointer | `/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-b` | | ssm tenant-A member arn pointer | `/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-a` | | ssm tenant-B member arn pointer | `/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-b` | each ExternalId must be at least 32 characters. random-generated, distinct per tenant. write them to the matching secret. trust docs reference the secret VALUE, not the secret arn (the value is the shared secret). policy paths: orchestrator role lives under `/orchestrator/`, member roles live under `/member/`. the verifier uses these paths to enumerate. heads-up on localstack: by default IAM is mocked and not enforced at runtime. the verifier mostly checks policy DOCUMENT shape (exactly what an auditor would do) , so the trust json and inline policies must be correct even if the runtime denial wouldn't actually trigger here. think of localstack as a json validator with an s3 backend.

Check AWS env vars and LocalStack health

shell
env | grep -E "AWS|LOCALSTACK" | sort && echo "---" && curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | head -50
output
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566
AWS_PAGER=
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test
---
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "disabled", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disabled", "route53": "disabled", "route53resolver": "disabled", "s3": "available", "s3control": "disabled", "scheduler": "disabled", "secretsmanager": "available", "ses": "disabled", "sns": "disabled", "sqs": "disabled", "ssm": "available", "stepfunctions": "disabled", "sts": "available", "support": "disabled", "swf": "disabled", "transcribe": "disabled"}, "edition": "community", "version": "4.13.1"}

[stdout]
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test
AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566
AWS_PAGER=
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test
---
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "disabled", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disabled", "route53": "disabled", "route53resolver": "disabled", "s3": "available", "s3control": "disabled", "scheduler": "disabled", "secretsmanager": "available", "ses": "disabled", "sns": "disabled", "sqs": "disabled", "ssm": "available", "stepfunctions": "disabled", "sts": "available", "support": "disabled", "swf": "disabled", "transcribe": "disabled"}, "edition": "community", "version": "4.13.1"}

Check tools and working dir

shell
ls /app && which aws python3 jq
output
/usr/local/bin/aws
/opt/venv/bin/python3
/usr/bin/jq

[stdout]
/usr/local/bin/aws
/opt/venv/bin/python3
/usr/bin/jq

Get account ID

shell
aws --endpoint-url=http://localstack:4566 sts get-caller-identity
output
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}

[stdout]
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}

List /app contents

shell
ls -la /app/
output
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 21 20:05 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 28 12:13 ..

[stdout]
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 21 20:05 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 Apr 28 12:13 ..
LocalStack has all the services I need (IAM, KMS, S3, SecretsManager, SSM, STS). Account ID is `000000000000`. I'll build this as a single bootstrap script plus a happy-path demo, with all policy documents shaped to satisfy the auditor's structural checks.
write · /app/setup.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Cross-account trust bootstrap.
# Runs against LocalStack. Provisions:
#   - KMS CMK + alias
#   - IAM users (orchestrator caller, attacker stand-in)
#   - OrchestratorRole (trusted by agent-runner)
#   - Two MemberRole-Tenant-{A,B} with ExternalId + SourceArn trust conditions
#   - Two Secrets Manager secrets (CMK-encrypted) holding per-tenant ExternalIds
#   - Resource policies on each secret naming the orchestrator role
#   - Two S3 buckets (one per tenant)
#   - SSM pointers under /harbor/...

set -euo pipefail

ENDPOINT="${AWS_ENDPOINT_URL:-http://localstack:4566}"
REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"

aws_() { aws --endpoint-url="$ENDPOINT" --region "$REGION" --output json "$@"; }

ORCH_ROLE_ARN="arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
MEMBER_A_ARN="arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A"
MEMBER_B_ARN="arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B"
AGENT_USER_ARN="arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:user/agent-runner"

mkdir -p /app/policies /app/state

echo "==> generating per-tenant ExternalId secrets (>=32 chars, distinct)"
EXT_ID_A=$(python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))")
EXT_ID_B=$(python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))")
if [[ "$EXT_ID_A" == "$EXT_ID_B" ]]; then
  echo "FATAL: ExternalIds collided" >&2
  exit 1
fi
if [[ ${#EXT_ID_A} -lt 32 || ${#EXT_ID_B} -lt 32 ]]; then
  echo "FATAL: ExternalId shorter than 32 chars" >&2
  exit 1
fi
printf '%s' "$EXT_ID_A" > /app/state/external-id-tenant-a.txt
printf '%s' "$EXT_ID_B" > /app/state/external-id-tenant-b.txt
chmod 600 /app/state/external-id-tenant-a.txt /app/state/external-id-tenant-b.txt

echo "==> creating KMS CMK + alias/cross-account-cmk"
KEY_ID=$(aws_ kms create-key \
  --description "cross-account ExternalId secret encryption key" \
  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"

# alias may already exist on re-run; tolerate that.
aws_ kms create-alias \
  --alias-name alias/cross-account-cmk \
  --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" 2>/dev/null || true

echo "==> writing KMS key policy (specific actions, specific resource)"
cat > /app/policies/kms-key-policy.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "cross-account-cmk-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "RootKeyAdministration",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root"},
      "Action": [
        "kms:DescribeKey",
        "kms:GetKeyPolicy",
        "kms:PutKeyPolicy",
        "kms:ListAliases",
        "kms:ListKeys",
        "kms:ListResourceTags",
        "kms:TagResource",
        "kms:UntagResource",
        "kms:UpdateKeyDescription",
        "kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion",
        "kms:CancelKeyDeletion",
        "kms:EnableKey",
        "kms:DisableKey",
        "kms:EnableKeyRotation",
        "kms:DisableKeyRotation",
        "kms:GetKeyRotationStatus",
        "kms:CreateAlias",
        "kms:DeleteAlias",
        "kms:UpdateAlias"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorDecryptOnly",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"},
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsManagerServiceUse",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "secretsmanager.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": [
        "kms:Encrypt",
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey",
        "kms:CreateGrant"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
aws_ kms put-key-policy \
  --key-id "$KEY_ID" \
  --policy-name default \
  --policy "file:///app/policies/kms-key-policy.json" >/dev/null

echo "==> creating IAM users: agent-runner, attacker-runner"
aws_ iam create-user --user-name agent-runner >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
aws_ iam create-user --user-name attacker-runner >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

echo "==> creating OrchestratorRole (path /orchestrator/, trust = agent-runner)"
cat > /app/policies/orchestrator-trust.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "AgentRunnerAssumes",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${AGENT_USER_ARN}"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
aws_ iam create-role \
  --role-name OrchestratorRole \
  --path /orchestrator/ \
  --assume-role-policy-document "file:///app/policies/orchestrator-trust.json" >/dev/null

echo "==> creating ExternalId secrets in Secrets Manager (CMK-encrypted)"
SECRET_A_ARN=$(aws_ secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a" \
  --description "ExternalId shared secret for MemberRole-Tenant-A trust" \
  --kms-key-id "alias/cross-account-cmk" \
  --secret-string "$EXT_ID_A" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)
SECRET_B_ARN=$(aws_ secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b" \
  --description "ExternalId shared secret for MemberRole-Tenant-B trust" \
  --kms-key-id "alias/cross-account-cmk" \
  --secret-string "$EXT_ID_B" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)

echo "==> attaching resource policies to each secret (orchestrator-only)"
cat > /app/policies/secret-a-resource-policy.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantAExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"},
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "${SECRET_A_ARN}"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
cat > /app/policies/secret-b-resource-policy.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantBExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"},
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "${SECRET_B_ARN}"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
aws_ secretsmanager put-resource-policy \
  --secret-id "$SECRET_A_ARN" \
  --resource-policy "file:///app/policies/secret-a-resource-policy.json" >/dev/null
aws_ secretsmanager put-resource-policy \
  --secret-id "$SECRET_B_ARN" \
  --resource-policy "file:///app/policies/secret-b-resource-policy.json" >/dev/null

echo "==> writing member role trust documents (ExternalId + SourceArn conditions)"
cat > /app/policies/member-tenant-a-trust.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "sts:ExternalId": "${EXT_ID_A}"
        },
        "ArnEquals": {
          "aws:SourceArn": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
EOF
cat > /app/policies/member-tenant-b-trust.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "sts:ExternalId": "${EXT_ID_B}"
        },
        "ArnEquals": {
          "aws:SourceArn": "${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
EOF

echo "==> creating MemberRole-Tenant-A and MemberRole-Tenant-B (path /member/)"
aws_ iam create-role \
  --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-A \
  --path /member/ \
  --assume-role-policy-document "file:///app/policies/member-tenant-a-trust.json" >/dev/null
aws_ iam create-role \
  --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-B \
  --path /member/ \
  --assume-role-policy-document "file:///app/policies/member-tenant-b-trust.json" >/dev/null

echo "==> writing per-tenant member identity policies (bucket-scoped, no wildcards)"
cat > /app/policies/member-tenant-a-inline.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "TenantABucketObjectAccess",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:GetObject"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-a-bucket/*"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
cat > /app/policies/member-tenant-b-inline.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "TenantBBucketObjectAccess",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "s3:PutObject",
        "s3:GetObject"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-b-bucket/*"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
aws_ iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-A \
  --policy-name TenantABucketAccess \
  --policy-document "file:///app/policies/member-tenant-a-inline.json"
aws_ iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-B \
  --policy-name TenantBBucketAccess \
  --policy-document "file:///app/policies/member-tenant-b-inline.json"

echo "==> writing orchestrator identity policy (explicit member arns + secret arns + cmk)"
cat > /app/policies/orchestrator-inline.json <<EOF
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "AssumeNamedMemberRolesOnly",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
      "Resource": [
        "${MEMBER_A_ARN}",
        "${MEMBER_B_ARN}"
      ]
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ReadOnlyExternalIdSecrets",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": [
        "${SECRET_A_ARN}",
        "${SECRET_B_ARN}"
      ]
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DecryptExternalIdSecretsWithCmk",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}"
    }
  ]
}
EOF
aws_ iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name OrchestratorRole \
  --policy-name OrchestratorAccess \
  --policy-document "file:///app/policies/orchestrator-inline.json"

echo "==> creating tenant S3 buckets"
aws_ s3api create-bucket --bucket tenant-a-bucket >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
aws_ s3api create-bucket --bucket tenant-b-bucket >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

echo "==> publishing SSM pointers under /harbor/..."
aws_ ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
  --name "/harbor/orchestrator/role-arn" \
  --type String --value "$ORCH_ROLE_ARN" >/dev/null
aws_ ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
  --name "/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a" \
  --type String --value "$SECRET_A_ARN" >/dev/null
aws_ ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
  --name "/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-b" \
  --type String --value "$SECRET_B_ARN" >/dev/null
aws_ ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
  --name "/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-a" \
  --type String --value "$MEMBER_A_ARN" >/dev/null
aws_ ssm put-parameter --overwrite \
  --name "/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-b" \
  --type String --value "$MEMBER_B_ARN" >/dev/null

echo "==> writing /app/state/env (for verifier convenience)"
cat > /app/state/env <<EOF
ACCOUNT_ID=${ACCOUNT_ID}
REGION=${REGION}
ENDPOINT=${ENDPOINT}
ORCH_ROLE_ARN=${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}
MEMBER_A_ARN=${MEMBER_A_ARN}
MEMBER_B_ARN=${MEMBER_B_ARN}
AGENT_USER_ARN=${AGENT_USER_ARN}
SECRET_A_ARN=${SECRET_A_ARN}
SECRET_B_ARN=${SECRET_B_ARN}
KEY_ID=${KEY_ID}
KEY_ARN=${KEY_ARN}
EOF

echo
echo "OK. Cross-account trust provisioned."
echo "  OrchestratorRole : ${ORCH_ROLE_ARN}"
echo "  MemberRole-Tenant-A : ${MEMBER_A_ARN}"
echo "  MemberRole-Tenant-B : ${MEMBER_B_ARN}"
echo "  ExternalId(A) : ${EXT_ID_A:0:8}... (len ${#EXT_ID_A})"
echo "  ExternalId(B) : ${EXT_ID_B:0:8}... (len ${#EXT_ID_B})"
echo "  Secret A ARN : ${SECRET_A_ARN}"
echo "  Secret B ARN : ${SECRET_B_ARN}"
echo "  CMK ARN : ${KEY_ARN}"
write · /app/happy_path.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Happy path: orchestrator -> read tenant-A ExternalId -> assume MemberRole-Tenant-A
# with that ExternalId -> put an object into tenant-a-bucket.
#
# On LocalStack the runtime IAM checks are not enforced, but this exercises the
# full call shape an auditor would expect to see executed in prod.

set -euo pipefail

ENDPOINT="${AWS_ENDPOINT_URL:-http://localstack:4566}"
REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"

aws_() { aws --endpoint-url="$ENDPOINT" --region "$REGION" --output json "$@"; }

# Resolve infra via SSM rather than re-deriving , same path the verifier uses.
ORCH_ROLE_ARN=$(aws_ ssm get-parameter --name /harbor/orchestrator/role-arn --query 'Parameter.Value' --output text)
SECRET_A_ARN=$(aws_ ssm get-parameter --name /harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a --query 'Parameter.Value' --output text)
MEMBER_A_ARN=$(aws_ ssm get-parameter --name /harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-a --query 'Parameter.Value' --output text)

echo "==> step 1: assume OrchestratorRole as agent-runner"
ORCH_CREDS=$(aws_ sts assume-role \
  --role-arn "$ORCH_ROLE_ARN" \
  --role-session-name agent-runner-session)
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$(echo "$ORCH_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.AccessKeyId)
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$(echo "$ORCH_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.SecretAccessKey)
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=$(echo "$ORCH_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.SessionToken)

echo "==> step 2: orchestrator reads ExternalId for tenant A from Secrets Manager"
EXT_ID_A=$(aws_ secretsmanager get-secret-value \
  --secret-id "$SECRET_A_ARN" \
  --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "    pulled secret (len ${#EXT_ID_A})"

echo "==> step 3: orchestrator assumes MemberRole-Tenant-A with --external-id"
MEMBER_CREDS=$(aws_ sts assume-role \
  --role-arn "$MEMBER_A_ARN" \
  --role-session-name tenant-a-session \
  --external-id "$EXT_ID_A")
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$(echo "$MEMBER_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.AccessKeyId)
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=$(echo "$MEMBER_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.SecretAccessKey)
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=$(echo "$MEMBER_CREDS" | jq -r .Credentials.SessionToken)

echo "==> step 4: write object to tenant-a-bucket"
TMP=$(mktemp)
printf 'hello from tenant-a member role at %s\n' "$(date -u +%FT%TZ)" > "$TMP"
aws_ s3api put-object \
  --bucket tenant-a-bucket \
  --key happy-path/proof.txt \
  --body "$TMP" >/dev/null
rm -f "$TMP"

echo "==> step 5: confirm object lands"
aws_ s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket tenant-a-bucket --query 'Contents[].Key'

echo "OK. Happy path succeeded."

Make scripts executable and run setup

shell
chmod +x /app/setup.sh /app/happy_path.sh && /app/setup.sh
output
==> generating per-tenant ExternalId secrets (>=32 chars, distinct)
==> creating KMS CMK + alias/cross-account-cmk
==> writing KMS key policy (specific actions, specific resource)
==> creating IAM users: agent-runner, attacker-runner
==> creating OrchestratorRole (path /orchestrator/, trust = agent-runner)
==> creating ExternalId secrets in Secrets Manager (CMK-encrypted)
==> attaching resource policies to each secret (orchestrator-only)
==> writing member role trust documents (ExternalId + SourceArn conditions)
==> creating MemberRole-Tenant-A and MemberRole-Tenant-B (path /member/)
==> writing per-tenant member identity policies (bucket-scoped, no wildcards)
==> writing orchestrator identity policy (explicit member arns + secret arns + cmk)
==> creating tenant S3 buckets
==> publishing SSM pointers under /harbor/...
==> writing /app/state/env (for verifier convenience)

OK. Cross-account trust provisioned.
  OrchestratorRole : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole
  MemberRole-Tenant-A : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A
  MemberRole-Tenant-B : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B
  ExternalId(A) : EEZGymdF... (len 64)
  ExternalId(B) : X8RZ0uFU... (len 64)
  Secret A ARN : arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA
  Secret B ARN : arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz
  CMK ARN : arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f6798f9c-b2d9-46f4-a6ce-4d05e411eb80

[stdout]
==> generating per-tenant ExternalId secrets (>=32 chars, distinct)
==> creating KMS CMK + alias/cross-account-cmk
==> writing KMS key policy (specific actions, specific resource)
==> creating IAM users: agent-runner, attacker-runner
==> creating OrchestratorRole (path /orchestrator/, trust = agent-runner)
==> creating ExternalId secrets in Secrets Manager (CMK-encrypted)
==> attaching resource policies to each secret (orchestrator-only)
==> writing member role trust documents (ExternalId + SourceArn conditions)
==> creating MemberRole-Tenant-A and MemberRole-Tenant-B (path /member/)
==> writing per-tenant member identity policies (bucket-scoped, no wildcards)
==> writing orchestrator identity policy (explicit member arns + secret arns + cmk)
==> creating tenant S3 buckets
==> publishing SSM pointers under /harbor/...
==> writing /app/state/env (for verifier convenience)

OK. Cross-account trust provisioned.
  OrchestratorRole : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole
  MemberRole-Tenant-A : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A
  MemberRole-Tenant-B : arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B
  ExternalId(A) : EEZGymdF... (len 64)
  ExternalId(B) : X8RZ0uFU... (len 64)
  Secret A ARN : arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA
  Secret B ARN : arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz
  CMK ARN : arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f6798f9c-b2d9-46f4-a6ce-4d05e411eb80

Run happy path demo

shell
/app/happy_path.sh
output
==> step 1: assume OrchestratorRole as agent-runner
==> step 2: orchestrator reads ExternalId for tenant A from Secrets Manager
    pulled secret (len 64)
==> step 3: orchestrator assumes MemberRole-Tenant-A with --external-id
==> step 4: write object to tenant-a-bucket
==> step 5: confirm object lands
[
    "happy-path/proof.txt"
]
OK. Happy path succeeded.

[stdout]
==> step 1: assume OrchestratorRole as agent-runner
==> step 2: orchestrator reads ExternalId for tenant A from Secrets Manager
    pulled secret (len 64)
==> step 3: orchestrator assumes MemberRole-Tenant-A with --external-id
==> step 4: write object to tenant-a-bucket
==> step 5: confirm object lands
[
    "happy-path/proof.txt"
]
OK. Happy path succeeded.
Happy path works end-to-end. Now let me verify the policy document shape against every check the verifier (and auditor) will run.

Inspect role trust policies

shell
set -e
ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566
A() { aws --endpoint-url=$ENDPOINT --output json "$@"; }

echo "=== member-a trust ==="
A iam get-role --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-A --query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'
echo
echo "=== member-b trust ==="
A iam get-role --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-B --query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'
echo
echo "=== orchestrator trust ==="
A iam get-role --role-name OrchestratorRole --query 'Role.AssumeRolePolicyDocument'
output
=== member-a trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "sts:ExternalId": "EEZGymdFUGpZfyfZ6AUhzaMKXwH3mndfbKmlAQtrimipqJCSwGMtJfELV_wr6rLf"
                },
                "ArnEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

=== member-b trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "sts:ExternalId": "X8RZ0uFUMAZkFo8WXWNl24Sa3oXgWJLRqebIhfhjaKwK1n7iWJtbglGfsh4-CC38"
                },
                "ArnEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

=== orchestrator trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AgentRunnerAssumes",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:user/agent-runner"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
        }
    ]
}

[stdout]
=== member-a trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "sts:ExternalId": "EEZGymdFUGpZfyfZ6AUhzaMKXwH3mndfbKmlAQtrimipqJCSwGMtJfELV_wr6rLf"
                },
                "ArnEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

=== member-b trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "OrchestratorAssumesWithExternalIdAndSourceArn",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Condition": {
                "StringEquals": {
                    "sts:ExternalId": "X8RZ0uFUMAZkFo8WXWNl24Sa3oXgWJLRqebIhfhjaKwK1n7iWJtbglGfsh4-CC38"
                },
                "ArnEquals": {
                    "aws:SourceArn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
                }
            }
        }
    ]
}

=== orchestrator trust ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AgentRunnerAssumes",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Principal": {
                "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:user/agent-runner"
            },
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
        }
    ]
}

Inspect inline policies

shell
set -e
ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566
A() { aws --endpoint-url=$ENDPOINT --output json "$@"; }

echo "=== orchestrator inline ==="
A iam get-role-policy --role-name OrchestratorRole --policy-name OrchestratorAccess --query 'PolicyDocument'
echo
echo "=== member-a inline ==="
A iam get-role-policy --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-A --policy-name TenantABucketAccess --query 'PolicyDocument'
echo
echo "=== member-b inline ==="
A iam get-role-policy --role-name MemberRole-Tenant-B --policy-name TenantBBucketAccess --query 'PolicyDocument'
output
=== orchestrator inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AssumeNamedMemberRolesOnly",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A",
                "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Sid": "ReadOnlyExternalIdSecrets",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA",
                "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DecryptExternalIdSecretsWithCmk",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "kms:Decrypt",
                "kms:DescribeKey"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f6798f9c-b2d9-46f4-a6ce-4d05e411eb80"
        }
    ]
}

=== member-a inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TenantABucketObjectAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:GetObject"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-a-bucket/*"
        }
    ]
}

=== member-b inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TenantBBucketObjectAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:GetObject"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-b-bucket/*"
        }
    ]
}

[stdout]
=== orchestrator inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "AssumeNamedMemberRolesOnly",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A",
                "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Sid": "ReadOnlyExternalIdSecrets",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
            "Resource": [
                "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA",
                "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz"
            ]
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DecryptExternalIdSecretsWithCmk",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "kms:Decrypt",
                "kms:DescribeKey"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f6798f9c-b2d9-46f4-a6ce-4d05e411eb80"
        }
    ]
}

=== member-a inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TenantABucketObjectAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:GetObject"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-a-bucket/*"
        }
    ]
}

=== member-b inline ===
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "TenantBBucketObjectAccess",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "s3:PutObject",
                "s3:GetObject"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::tenant-b-bucket/*"
        }
    ]
}

Inspect secret resource policies and SSM

shell
set -e
ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566
A() { aws --endpoint-url=$ENDPOINT --output json "$@"; }
SA=$(A ssm get-parameter --name /harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a --query Parameter.Value --output text)
SB=$(A ssm get-parameter --name /harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-b --query Parameter.Value --output text)

echo "=== secret A resource policy ==="
A secretsmanager get-resource-policy --secret-id "$SA" --query 'ResourcePolicy' --output text | jq .
echo
echo "=== secret B resource policy ==="
A secretsmanager get-resource-policy --secret-id "$SB" --query 'ResourcePolicy' --output text | jq .
echo
echo "=== ssm pointers ==="
A ssm get-parameters-by-path --path /harbor --recursive --query 'Parameters[].[Name,Value]' --output text
output
=== secret A resource policy ===
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantAExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
      },
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA"
    }
  ]
}

=== secret B resource policy ===
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantBExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
      },
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz"
    }
  ]
}

=== ssm pointers ===
/harbor/orchestrator/role-arn	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole
/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a	arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA
/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-b	arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz
/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-a	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A
/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-b	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B

[stdout]
=== secret A resource policy ===
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantAExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
      },
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA"
    }
  ]
}

=== secret B resource policy ===
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "OrchestratorReadsTenantBExternalId",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {
        "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole"
      },
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz"
    }
  ]
}

=== ssm pointers ===
/harbor/orchestrator/role-arn	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole
/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-a	arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-a-MLmPUA
/harbor/external-id-secret-arn-tenant-b	arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:harbor/cross-account/external-id-tenant-b-JBUBYz
/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-a	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-A
/harbor/member-role-arn-tenant-b	arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/member/MemberRole-Tenant-B
All checks pass against the policy documents. Quick walkthrough of what's verifiable: **Member trust docs** (both tenants) , `Principal.AWS` = orchestrator role ARN (not `*`), `Action: sts:AssumeRole` (exact), `Condition.StringEquals['sts:ExternalId']` matches that tenant's secret value, `Condition.ArnEquals['aws:SourceArn']` = orchestrator role ARN. Tenant-A and Tenant-B ExternalIds are distinct 64-char tokens. **Least privilege**: - OrchestratorRole inline: `sts:AssumeRole` enumerates only the two member ARNs; `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` enumerates only the two secret ARNs; `kms:Decrypt`/`DescribeKey` scoped to the CMK ARN. No wildcards. - MemberRole-Tenant-A inline: `s3:PutObject`/`GetObject` on `arn:aws:s3:::tenant-a-bucket/*` only. - MemberRole-Tenant-B inline: same shape, `tenant-b-bucket/*` only. - KMS key policy uses specific actions and the key ARN as Resource , no `kms:*`, no `Resource: "*"`. **Two-sided secret access** , each ExternalId secret has both an identity-side allow (orchestrator inline) and a resource-side allow (`PutResourcePolicy` naming `arn:...:role/orchestrator/OrchestratorRole` as Principal.AWS for `GetSecretValue`). **Happy path** end-to-end (`/app/happy_path.sh`) , assume OrchestratorRole as `agent-runner`, pull tenant-A ExternalId from Secrets Manager, `sts:AssumeRole` against MemberRole-Tenant-A with `--external-id`, write `happy-path/proof.txt` to `tenant-a-bucket`. All five steps succeed. **Layout**: - `/app/setup.sh` , bootstrap (run once) - `/app/happy_path.sh` , demo - `/app/policies/*.json` , rendered policy docs (also what's attached on AWS) - `/app/state/env` , generated ARNs / IDs for the verifier - `/app/state/external-id-tenant-{a,b}.txt` , saved secret values (mode 0600), so the verifier can compare trust-doc `sts:ExternalId` against the secret value without re-reading from Secrets Manager LocalStack caveat as you flagged: runtime IAM denial isn't enforced here, so the third-party-impersonation and confused-deputy attacks can't be observed *failing* on this stack , but the trust documents that *would* deny them in real AWS are the artifacts the auditor reads, and those are correct.
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/kYOF2CWxNpWjkfLdSntLH/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 20 items

../tests/test_state.py::test_01_orchestrator_role_exists_at_orchestrator_path PASSED [  5%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_02_member_roles_exist_at_member_path PASSED [ 10%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_03_external_id_secrets_exist_with_min_length PASSED [ 15%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_04_both_tenant_buckets_exist PASSED         [ 20%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_05_ssm_pointers_resolve PASSED              [ 25%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_06_member_trusts_have_externalid_stringequals_matching_secret PASSED [ 30%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_07_member_trusts_have_sourcearn_equal_to_orchestrator_arn PASSED [ 35%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_08_member_trusts_action_is_assumerole_only PASSED [ 40%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_09_member_trusts_principal_is_orchestrator_not_wildcard PASSED [ 45%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_10_externalids_differ_per_tenant PASSED     [ 50%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_11_orchestrator_identity_lists_member_arns_explicitly_no_wildcard PASSED [ 55%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_12_orchestrator_secret_get_scoped_to_two_secret_arns PASSED [ 60%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_13_orchestrator_kms_decrypt_scoped_to_cmk_arn PASSED [ 65%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_14_member_inline_policies_scope_to_own_tenant_bucket_only PASSED [ 70%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_15_secret_resource_policies_admit_orchestrator PASSED [ 75%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_16_kms_key_policy_has_account_root_statement FAILED [ 80%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_17_no_admin_managed_policies_attached_to_any_role PASSED [ 85%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_18_e2e_assume_with_externalid_then_put_object_succeeds PASSED [ 90%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_19_member_a_inline_does_not_reference_tenant_b_bucket PASSED [ 95%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_20_orchestrator_has_no_wildcard_assume_role_resource PASSED [100%]

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
______________ test_16_kms_key_policy_has_account_root_statement _______________

    def test_16_kms_key_policy_has_account_root_statement():
        """KMS key policy has root statement."""
        cmk_arn = _kms_key_arn()
        kms = _client("kms")
        pol = kms.get_key_policy(KeyId=cmk_arn, PolicyName="default")["Policy"]
        doc = json.loads(pol)
        found_root = False
        for s in _stmts(doc):
            p = s.get("Principal", {})
            aws = p.get("AWS") if isinstance(p, dict) else None
            arns = _as_list(aws)
            if any(a.endswith(":root") for a in arns):
                actions = _as_list(s.get("Action"))
                if actions == ["kms:*"] or "kms:*" in actions:
                    found_root = True
>       assert found_root, (
            "KMS key policy missing the 'EnableIAMUserPermissions' root statement"
        )
E       AssertionError: KMS key policy missing the 'EnableIAMUserPermissions' root statement
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:388: AssertionError
=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_state.py: 56 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/kYOF2CWxNpWjkfLdSntLH/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_01_orchestrator_role_exists_at_orchestrator_path
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_02_member_roles_exist_at_member_path
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_03_external_id_secrets_exist_with_min_length
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_04_both_tenant_buckets_exist
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_05_ssm_pointers_resolve
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_06_member_trusts_have_externalid_stringequals_matching_secret
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_07_member_trusts_have_sourcearn_equal_to_orchestrator_arn
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_08_member_trusts_action_is_assumerole_only
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_09_member_trusts_principal_is_orchestrator_not_wildcard
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_10_externalids_differ_per_tenant
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_11_orchestrator_identity_lists_member_arns_explicitly_no_wildcard
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_12_orchestrator_secret_get_scoped_to_two_secret_arns
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_13_orchestrator_kms_decrypt_scoped_to_cmk_arn
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_14_member_inline_policies_scope_to_own_tenant_bucket_only
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_15_secret_resource_policies_admit_orchestrator
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_17_no_admin_managed_policies_attached_to_any_role
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_18_e2e_assume_with_externalid_then_put_object_succeeds
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_19_member_a_inline_does_not_reference_tenant_b_bucket
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_20_orchestrator_has_no_wildcard_assume_role_resource
FAILED ../tests/test_state.py::test_16_kms_key_policy_has_account_root_statement
================== 1 failed, 19 passed, 56 warnings in 0.57s ===================

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_78713a5c309a41c8. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_78713a5c309a41c8 · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.