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SyncVals · Trajectory

iam-permissions-boundary-ceiling

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✗ failed HARNESS_ERROR ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
HARNESS_ERRORInfrastructure failure, the agent never ran properly. Not a signal about agent or task.
SubtypeInsufficient Credits/Timeout
EvidenceAgent trajectory shows only the instruction message followed by assistant response: 'Credit balance is too low'. The agent never made any API calls, never examined the codebase, and never attempted any fixes. Raw log is empty. The test suite ran on a pre-configured environment and executed 27 tests independently of agent actions, failing 14 of them due to misconfigurations that existed before the agent ran.
Root causeThe agent encountered a credit/resource limit immediately upon receiving the task instruction and was unable to execute any work. This is an infrastructure constraint on the agent, not a problem with the task specification or difficulty.
RecommendationN/A - task is fine. The agent's failure was due to insufficient credits to start work. The instruction is exceptionally well-specified with clear requirements, exact resource names, behavioral contracts, and explicit warnings about IAM design anti-patterns (Deny statements, NotResource, wildcards). A properly resourced agent should be able to diagnose and fix the five independent configuration bugs described in the task.
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
2 tool calls · 1 tool types · 2 steps
a teammate left mid-setup and the analyst access design isn't working: the analyst is supposed to be capped by a permissions boundary so they can only read/write objects under the `confidential/` prefix of one specific bucket (`vault-bucket`) using one specific customer-managed kms key (`alias/vault-kms`). nothing else , not the `public/` prefix, not other buckets, not creating new kms keys, not escalating their own iam. the pieces exist (the iam user `analyst-user`, the two managed policies `AnalystIdentityPolicy` and `AnalystBoundary`, the bucket, the cmk, the access keys for the analyst, ssm pointers); something is off. diagnose and fix it **in place** (recreating an individual managed policy by deleting and re-creating under the same name is fine when its document can't be edited in place; replacing the user is fine when an attribute set at create time can't be changed in place , keep the same names, and update ssm pointers to match if you do). a manifest of every resource (arns, names, the analyst's access keys) is published under ssm at `/harbor/boundary/*`; read it instead of guessing. the environment is reachable at `$AWS_ENDPOINT_URL` (`ENFORCE_IAM=1`, account `000000000000`, region `us-east-1`). "fixed" is judged end-to-end and in shape. signing real requests with the analyst's own access keys (exported via the ssm manifest), under `ENFORCE_IAM=1`, the runtime evaluates identity ∩ boundary and the behaviour must be: - `s3:PutObject` and `s3:GetObject` under `arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/confidential/<anything>` succeed - `s3:PutObject` under `arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/<anything>` is `AccessDenied` - `s3:PutObject` on any bucket other than `vault-bucket` is `AccessDenied` - `kms:CreateKey` is `AccessDenied` - a `kms:Decrypt`/`kms:GenerateDataKey` call against the vault cmk on behalf of the analyst succeeds (so that confidential objects encrypted with that cmk can actually be read by the analyst) `iam:GetUser` on `analyst-user` has to return a `PermissionsBoundary.PermissionsBoundaryArn` pointing at the `AnalystBoundary` managed policy , that's the only signal the auditor uses to confirm the boundary is wired up. and the boundary's *active* document (its default version , managed policies can have several versions but only one is in force) has to actually shape the runtime behaviour above. a permissions boundary is a **ceiling**, not a deny list, and it's not the same as an SCP. work out the shape from behaviour: anything you'd write into the boundary that doesn't translate into the runtime answers above is wrong. the identity policy stays deliberately broad (`s3:*` on `*`, `kms:*` on `*`) so that the intersection semantics can be observed; if the identity policy itself does any gating, the design's whole point is lost. names the verifier reads from ssm , use them exactly: | thing | name | |-|-| | iam user | `analyst-user` | | identity managed policy | `AnalystIdentityPolicy` | | boundary managed policy | `AnalystBoundary` | | s3 bucket | `vault-bucket` | | kms alias | `alias/vault-kms` | | ssm , boundary policy arn | `/harbor/boundary/policy-arn` | | ssm , identity policy arn | `/harbor/boundary/identity-arn` | | ssm , user arn | `/harbor/boundary/user-arn` | | ssm , cmk arn | `/harbor/boundary/kms-key-arn` | | ssm , analyst access key id | `/harbor/boundary/analyst-access-key-id` | | ssm , analyst secret key | `/harbor/boundary/analyst-secret-key` | | cloudwatch log group | `/harbor/boundary/decisions` |
Credit balance is too low
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
downloading uv 0.9.7 aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu
Downloading botocore (12.7MiB)
Downloading pygments (1.2MiB)
 Downloading pygments
 Downloading botocore
Installed 13 packages in 35ms
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/n-s162B1cOUVjM3gPMUjk/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 27 items

../tests/test_outputs.py::test_01_analyst_user_exists PASSED             [  3%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_02_identity_policy_attached_to_user PASSED [  7%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_03_boundary_attached_via_get_user FAILED  [ 11%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_04_vault_bucket_exists_with_public_access_block PASSED [ 14%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_05_kms_alias_and_ssm_pointers_resolve FAILED [ 18%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_06_identity_policy_grants_full_s3_and_full_kms PASSED [ 22%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_07_identity_policy_has_no_explicit_deny_anywhere FAILED [ 25%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_08_user_has_no_admin_managed_policy_attached PASSED [ 29%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_09_boundary_effect_allow_only FAILED      [ 33%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_10_boundary_has_no_NotResource_or_NotAction FAILED [ 37%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_11_boundary_object_actions_scoped_to_confidential_prefix FAILED [ 40%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_12_boundary_listbucket_uses_s3_prefix_condition FAILED [ 44%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_13_boundary_kms_actions_scoped_to_cmk_arn PASSED [ 48%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_14_boundary_does_not_grant_kms_create_key_or_wildcard_kms FAILED [ 51%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_15_boundary_does_not_grant_iam_self_modify PASSED [ 55%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_16_boundary_size_under_managed_policy_limit PASSED [ 59%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_17_boundary_allows_confidential_put_via_simulator FAILED [ 62%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_18_boundary_denies_public_put_via_simulator PASSED [ 66%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_19_boundary_allows_kms_decrypt_via_simulator PASSED [ 70%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_20_boundary_denies_kms_create_key_via_simulator PASSED [ 74%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_21_analyst_can_put_to_confidential_prefix PASSED [ 77%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_22_analyst_cannot_put_to_public_prefix PASSED [ 81%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_23_analyst_cannot_create_kms_key FAILED   [ 85%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_24_analyst_cannot_put_to_a_different_bucket FAILED [ 88%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_25_boundary_object_resource_prefix_is_lowercase_confidential FAILED [ 92%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_26_ssm_policy_arn_resolves_to_a_live_boundary_managed_policy FAILED [ 96%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_27_boundary_default_version_reflects_the_runtime_intended_shape FAILED [100%]

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
____________________ test_03_boundary_attached_via_get_user ____________________

    def test_03_boundary_attached_via_get_user():
        user = _get_user()
        pb = user.get("PermissionsBoundary") or {}
        arn = pb.get("PermissionsBoundaryArn")
>       assert arn == BOUNDARY_ARN_EXPECTED, (
            f"GetUser.User.PermissionsBoundary.PermissionsBoundaryArn={arn!r}; "
            f"expected {BOUNDARY_ARN_EXPECTED!r} , the boundary managed policy is defined "
            f"but not actually attached to the user as a permissions boundary"
        )
E       AssertionError: GetUser.User.PermissionsBoundary.PermissionsBoundaryArn=None; expected 'arn:aws:iam::000000000000:policy/AnalystBoundary' , the boundary managed policy is defined but not actually attached to the user as a permissions boundary
E       assert None == 'arn:aws:iam::000000000000:policy/AnalystBoundary'

/tests/test_outputs.py:181: AssertionError
__________________ test_05_kms_alias_and_ssm_pointers_resolve __________________

    def test_05_kms_alias_and_ssm_pointers_resolve():
        kms = _client("kms")
        info = kms.describe_key(KeyId="alias/vault-kms")["KeyMetadata"]
        assert info["Arn"].startswith(f"arn:aws:kms:{REGION}:{ACCOUNT_ID}:key/")
>       assert _ssm(SSM_BOUNDARY_ARN) == BOUNDARY_ARN_EXPECTED
E       AssertionError: assert 'arn:aws:iam:...oundaryPolicy' == 'arn:aws:iam:...alystBoundary'
E         
E         - arn:aws:iam::000000000000:policy/AnalystBoundary
E         + arn:aws:iam::000000000000:policy/AnalystBoundaryPolicy
E         ?                                                 ++++++

/tests/test_outputs.py:200: AssertionError
____________ test_07_identity_policy_has_no_explicit_deny_anywhere _____________

    def test_07_identity_policy_has_no_explicit_deny_anywhere():
        for s in _stmts(_identity_doc()):
>           assert s.get("Effect") != "Deny", (
                f"identity policy contains an Effect:Deny statement {s!r} , the design requires the boundary "
                f"alone to do the gating; an explicit Deny in the identity policy means the boundary's "
                f"semantics aren't being exercised, and the auditor flags the design as broken"
            )
E           AssertionError: identity policy contains an Effect:Deny statement {'Sid': 'AnalystGuard', 'Effect': 'Deny', 'Action': 's3:PutObject', 'Resource': 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/*'} , the design requires the boundary alone to do the gating; an explicit Deny in the identity policy means the boundary's semantics aren't being exercised, and the auditor flags the design as broken
E           assert 'Deny' != 'Deny'
E            +  where 'Deny' = <built-in method get of dict object at 0xffff96020bc0>('Effect')
E            +    where <built-in method get of dict object at 0xffff96020bc0> = {'Action': 's3:PutObject', 'Effect': 'Deny', 'Resource': 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/*', 'Sid': 'AnalystGuard'}.get

/tests/test_outputs.py:228: AssertionError
______________________ test_09_boundary_effect_allow_only ______________________

    def test_09_boundary_effect_allow_only():
        for s in _stmts(_boundary_doc()):
            eff = s.get("Effect")
>           assert eff == "Allow", (
                f"boundary has a non-Allow statement: {s!r} , a permissions boundary is a CEILING, "
                f"not a deny list; anything not listed is implicitly denied by the boundary itself, "
                f"and the auditor rejects an explicit Deny in the boundary as a design smell"
            )
E           AssertionError: boundary has a non-Allow statement: {'Sid': 'PublicGuard', 'Effect': 'Deny', 'Action': 's3:*', 'Resource': 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/*'} , a permissions boundary is a CEILING, not a deny list; anything not listed is implicitly denied by the boundary itself, and the auditor rejects an explicit Deny in the boundary as a design smell
E           assert 'Deny' == 'Allow'
E             
E             - Allow
E             + Deny

/tests/test_outputs.py:251: AssertionError
_______________ test_10_boundary_has_no_NotResource_or_NotAction _______________

    def test_10_boundary_has_no_NotResource_or_NotAction():
        for s in _stmts(_boundary_doc()):
>           assert "NotResource" not in s, (
                f"boundary statement uses NotResource: {s!r} , NotResource does not invert into an allow-elsewhere, "
                f"it inverts the resource match in a way that's almost never what the author meant; the auditor "
                f"forbids it in boundary documents"
            )
E           AssertionError: boundary statement uses NotResource: {'Sid': 'BucketListing', 'Effect': 'Allow', 'Action': ['s3:ListBucket', 's3:GetBucketLocation'], 'NotResource': 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/*'} , NotResource does not invert into an allow-elsewhere, it inverts the resource match in a way that's almost never what the author meant; the auditor forbids it in boundary documents
E           assert 'NotResource' not in {'Action': ['s3:ListBucket', 's3:GetBucketLocation'], 'Effect': 'Allow', 'NotResource': 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/public/*', 'Sid': 'BucketListing'}

/tests/test_outputs.py:260: AssertionError
________ test_11_boundary_object_actions_scoped_to_confidential_prefix _________

    def test_11_boundary_object_actions_scoped_to_confidential_prefix():
        bucket = _bucket()
        expected = f"arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}/confidential/*"
        object_actions = {"s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject", "s3:DeleteObject"}
        found_any = False
        for s in _stmts(_boundary_doc()):
            if s.get("Effect") != "Allow":
                continue
            actions = set(_as_list(s.get("Action")))
            if not (actions & object_actions):
                continue
            found_any = True
            resources = _as_list(s.get("Resource"))
            assert "*" not in resources, (
                f"boundary object-level Allow statement has Resource '*' (no scope): {s!r} , must be narrowed "
                f"to {expected!r}"
            )
            bad = [r for r in resources if r != expected]
>           assert not bad, (
                f"boundary object-level Allow statement has Resource={resources!r}; expected exactly [{expected!r}]"
            )
E           AssertionError: boundary object-level Allow statement has Resource=['arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/Confidential/*']; expected exactly ['arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/confidential/*']
E           assert not ['arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket/Confidential/*']

/tests/test_outputs.py:286: AssertionError
_____________ test_12_boundary_listbucket_uses_s3_prefix_condition _____________

    def test_12_boundary_listbucket_uses_s3_prefix_condition():
        bucket = _bucket()
        bucket_arn = f"arn:aws:s3:::{bucket}"
        found = False
        for s in _stmts(_boundary_doc()):
            if s.get("Effect") != "Allow":
                continue
            actions = set(_as_list(s.get("Action")))
            if "s3:ListBucket" not in actions:
                continue
            found = True
            resources = _as_list(s.get("Resource"))
>           assert bucket_arn in resources, (
                f"boundary s3:ListBucket Resource={resources!r} does not include the bucket ARN {bucket_arn!r}; "
                f"ListBucket is a bucket-level action and must target the bucket ARN, not an object-prefix ARN"
            )
E           AssertionError: boundary s3:ListBucket Resource=[] does not include the bucket ARN 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket'; ListBucket is a bucket-level action and must target the bucket ARN, not an object-prefix ARN
E           assert 'arn:aws:s3:::vault-bucket' in []

/tests/test_outputs.py:307: AssertionError
________ test_14_boundary_does_not_grant_kms_create_key_or_wildcard_kms ________

    def test_14_boundary_does_not_grant_kms_create_key_or_wildcard_kms():
        actions = _all_actions(_stmts(_boundary_doc()))
        assert "kms:CreateKey" not in actions, (
            "boundary grants kms:CreateKey , the analyst could create their own keys outside the design"
        )
>       assert "kms:*" not in actions, (
            "boundary grants kms:* , that's a wildcard over every kms action including CreateKey, "
            "and the design forbids it; the boundary's kms grants must be limited to the data-key "
            "actions needed to use the existing cmk"
        )
E       AssertionError: boundary grants kms:* , that's a wildcard over every kms action including CreateKey, and the design forbids it; the boundary's kms grants must be limited to the data-key actions needed to use the existing cmk
E       assert 'kms:*' not in ['s3:ListBucket', 's3:GetBucketLocation', 's3:GetObject', 's3:PutObject', 's3:DeleteObject', 's3:*', ...]

/tests/test_outputs.py:350: AssertionError
____________ test_17_boundary_allows_confidential_put_via_simulator ____________

    def test_17_boundary_allows_confidential_put_via_si

… (truncated at 12,000 chars, full verifier log is in the trial artifacts)

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_78f9a6c81c764b54. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_78f9a6c81c764b54 · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.