SyncValsverifier → artifact → classifier → verdict
SyncVals · Trajectory

sfn-secrets-rotation-chain

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✗ failed GOOD_FAILURE ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
GOOD_FAILUREHonest miss, the agent ran correctly but couldn't solve it. Expected for a hard task; the task is sound.
SubtypeIncomplete Understanding
EvidenceTest failures show: (1) KMS key policy doesn't have rotator role in Principal.AWS with Decrypt/GenerateDataKey actions - test expects key policy itself to grant permissions, (2) Rotator lambda missing resource-based policy for secretsmanager.amazonaws.com - test calls get_policy() and fails with ResourceNotFoundException, (3) Parent role missing states:DescribeExecution/StopExecution on child SM - instruction mentions .sync:2 managed rule but doesn't explicitly list all required actions, (4) Child role missing secretsmanager:RotateSecret - instruction doesn't specify this permission is needed. Agent successfully created KMS key, secret, lambdas, roles with inline policies, EventBridge bus/rule/targets, both SMs, and verified EventBridge notification path works. 11 of 15 tests pass including end-to-end parent execution test.
Root causeThe agent created the infrastructure but didn't understand that AWS permissions need to be configured at multiple layers: (1) role inline policies were created but KMS key policy itself needs to be updated to grant the role, (2) lambda resource-based policies must be added separately from role policies, (3) the parent role needs all three states actions for .sync:2 callback rule setup, which is only mentioned as a "heads-up" in the instruction without explicitly stating all actions needed.
RecommendationN/A - task is fine. The instruction's "heads-up" about .sync:2 managed rules is somewhat subtle, and the AWS permission model (role policies vs resource-based policies vs key policies) requires understanding that multiple permission boundaries must be configured. A more explicit instruction could list: (1) KMS key policy must grant rotator role via Principal.AWS statement, (2) rotator lambda needs AddPermission for secretsmanager service principal, (3) parent role needs states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/StopExecution on child, (4) child role needs secretsmanager:RotateSecret. However, this is learnable from the test error messages and AWS documentation."
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
44 tool calls · 4 tool types · 58 steps
ok so we need a secrets rotation pipeline on localstack and right now the box is empty. localstack is at `http://localstack:4566`, creds are already exported (`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, same for secret, region `us-east-1`), you've got `aws`, `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`, `zip`, `curl`. build the whole thing. the app reads its db password from secrets manager. we need it rotatable on demand via step functions, and every successful rotation has to notify a downstream lambda. no humans in the loop. shape of it: - a parent state machine is the only entry point. it doesn't do the actual work , it hands off to a child SM and waits for it to finish. - the child SM does two things: kicks off rotation, then puts a `RotationComplete` event onto a custom eventbridge bus. - a rule on that bus routes to a notification lambda. the notification lambda isn't invoked directly by the child , it rides the bus. - the secret is encrypted with a customer-managed KMS key. not the aws-managed one, please. done looks like this: one `start-execution` on the parent (no input), and within 90s: - parent hits `SUCCEEDED` - `AWSCURRENT` on the secret moves to a new version, the string actually changes, old one gets `AWSPREVIOUS` - the notification lambda writes a log line that starts with `notified:` also: least privilege. the verifier reads policy docs directly, not just "does it work end-to-end". don't wildcard your way out. names the verifier grabs by hand, use them exactly: | thing | name | |-|-| | secret | `app/db/password` | | kms alias | `alias/app-rotation-key` | | rotator lambda | `secrets-rotator` | | rotator lambda role | `secrets-rotator-role` | | notification lambda | `notification-lambda` | | parent SM | `rotation-orchestrator` | | parent SM role | `rotation-orchestrator-role` | | child SM | `rotation-child` | | child SM role | `rotation-child-role` | | eventbridge bus | `rotation-events` | | eventbridge rule | `on-rotation-success` | rule pattern: `source` = `rotation.pipeline`, `detail-type` = `RotationComplete`. python3.11 for both lambdas. they run on the shared compose network so `http://localstack:4566` is reachable from inside them. localstack community 4.13.1. pick any password generator you like , just make sure two consecutive rotations produce different strings. one heads-up on the parent → child handoff: Step Functions implements `StartExecution.sync:2` by creating an EventBridge managed rule behind the scenes to notify the parent when the child finishes. That means the parent SM's execution role needs `events:PutRule`, `events:PutTargets`, `events:DescribeRule` in addition to the usual `states:StartExecution` / `states:DescribeExecution` / `states:StopExecution` on the child. Without those events perms the parent will fail with "not authorized to create managed-rule".

Check tooling and localstack health

shell
aws --version && python3 --version && curl -s http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | head -c 500
output
aws-cli/2.34.33 Python/3.14.4 Linux/6.10.14-linuxkit exe/aarch64.ubuntu.24
Python 3.12.3
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "available", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disable

[stdout]
aws-cli/2.34.33 Python/3.14.4 Linux/6.10.14-linuxkit exe/aarch64.ubuntu.24
Python 3.12.3
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "available", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disable

Check env vars

shell
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=$AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=$AWS_DEFAULT_REGION AWS_REGION=$AWS_REGION"
output
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 AWS_REGION=

[stdout]
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1 AWS_REGION=

Inspect working dir

shell
ls /app/ 2>/dev/null && pwd
output
/app

[stdout]
/app

Verify localstack auth

shell
aws --endpoint-url=http://localstack:4566 sts get-caller-identity
output
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}

[stdout]
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}

Create build directory

shell
mkdir -p /app/build && ls /app/
output
build

[stdout]
build
LocalStack is healthy, account is `000000000000`. Let me build this systematically. First, the KMS key, secret, and lambda source files.

Create customer-managed KMS key

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS kms create-key --description "app-rotation-key" --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT --query 'KeyMetadata.{KeyId:KeyId,Arn:Arn}' --output json
output
{
    "KeyId": "f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce"
}

[stdout]
{
    "KeyId": "f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce"
}

Create KMS alias

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
KEY_ID=f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS kms create-alias --alias-name alias/app-rotation-key --target-key-id $KEY_ID && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS kms describe-key --key-id alias/app-rotation-key --query 'KeyMetadata.Arn' --output text
output
arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce

[stdout]
arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce

Create secret encrypted with CMK

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name app/db/password \
  --description "DB password for app" \
  --secret-string '{"username":"app","password":"initial-password-seed"}' \
  --kms-key-id alias/app-rotation-key \
  --query 'ARN' --output text
output
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-gjOQOb

[stdout]
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-gjOQOb

Confirm secret details

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query '{ARN:ARN,KmsKeyId:KmsKeyId}' --output json
output
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-gjOQOb",
    "KmsKeyId": "alias/app-rotation-key"
}

[stdout]
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-gjOQOb",
    "KmsKeyId": "alias/app-rotation-key"
}
ToolSearch
{
  "query": "select:TodoWrite",
  "max_results": 1
}

, output, 
{"type": "tool_reference", "tool_name": "TodoWrite"}
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s
Now writing the lambda sources. The rotator will do full stage management (`PutSecretValue` + `UpdateSecretVersionStage`) in one invocation so the child SM can call it directly.
write · /app/build/rotator/handler.py
import os
import json
import secrets
import string
import uuid
import boto3

ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("AWS_ENDPOINT_URL", "http://localstack:4566")
SECRET_ID = os.environ["SECRET_ID"]

sm = boto3.client("secretsmanager", endpoint_url=ENDPOINT)


def _new_password(length: int = 28) -> str:
    alphabet = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
    return "".join(secrets.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(length))


def handler(event, context):
    desc = sm.describe_secret(SecretId=SECRET_ID)
    current_version_id = None
    for vid, stages in desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {}).items():
        if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
            current_version_id = vid
            break

    current = sm.get_secret_value(SecretId=SECRET_ID, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
    try:
        payload = json.loads(current["SecretString"])
    except (ValueError, TypeError):
        payload = {"username": "app", "password": ""}

    new_password = _new_password()
    while new_password == payload.get("password"):
        new_password = _new_password()
    payload["password"] = new_password

    new_version_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
    sm.put_secret_value(
        SecretId=SECRET_ID,
        ClientRequestToken=new_version_id,
        SecretString=json.dumps(payload),
        VersionStages=["AWSPENDING"],
    )

    kwargs = {
        "SecretId": SECRET_ID,
        "VersionStage": "AWSCURRENT",
        "MoveToVersionId": new_version_id,
    }
    if current_version_id:
        kwargs["RemoveFromVersionId"] = current_version_id
    sm.update_secret_version_stage(**kwargs)

    sm.update_secret_version_stage(
        SecretId=SECRET_ID,
        VersionStage="AWSPENDING",
        RemoveFromVersionId=new_version_id,
    )

    return {
        "secretId": SECRET_ID,
        "newVersionId": new_version_id,
        "previousVersionId": current_version_id,
    }
write · /app/build/notifier/handler.py
import json


def handler(event, context):
    detail = event.get("detail", {}) if isinstance(event, dict) else {}
    secret_id = detail.get("secretId", "<unknown>")
    version_id = detail.get("newVersionId", "<unknown>")
    print(f"notified: rotation complete for {secret_id} version={version_id} event={json.dumps(event)}")
    return {"ok": True}

Package lambdas

shell
cd /app/build/rotator && zip -q /app/build/rotator.zip handler.py && cd /app/build/notifier && zip -q /app/build/notifier.zip handler.py && ls -la /app/build/*.zip
output
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 378 Apr 22 06:48 /app/build/notifier.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 903 Apr 22 06:48 /app/build/rotator.zip

[stdout]
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 378 Apr 22 06:48 /app/build/notifier.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 903 Apr 22 06:48 /app/build/rotator.zip
Now the IAM roles for each lambda , scoped strictly.
write · /app/build/trust-lambda.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/trust-states.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "states.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/policy-rotator.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsRotation",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "UseCMK",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/__KMS_KEY_ID__"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "WriteLogs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "CreateLogGroup",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "logs:CreateLogGroup",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/policy-notifier.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "WriteLogs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/notification-lambda:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "CreateLogGroup",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "logs:CreateLogGroup",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/notification-lambda"
    }
  ]
}

Fill KMS key ID into rotator policy

shell
KEY_ID=f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce && \
sed -i "s/__KMS_KEY_ID__/$KEY_ID/g" /app/build/policy-rotator.json && \
cat /app/build/policy-rotator.json | head -40
output
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsRotation",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "UseCMK",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "WriteLogs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "CreateLogGroup",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "logs:CreateLogGroup",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator"
    }
  ]
}

[stdout]
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsRotation",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "UseCMK",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/f8467244-6aa8-4165-8e92-e83d2d52a5ce"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "WriteLogs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "CreateLogGroup",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "logs:CreateLogGroup",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator"
    }
  ]
}
Now create the IAM roles and deploy the lambdas.

Create lambda roles with scoped policies

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam create-role --role-name secrets-rotator-role \
  --assume-role-policy-document file:///app/build/trust-lambda.json \
  --query 'Role.Arn' --output text && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam put-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role \
  --policy-name rotator-inline --policy-document file:///app/build/policy-rotator.json && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam create-role --role-name notification-lambda-role \
  --assume-role-policy-document file:///app/build/trust-lambda.json \
  --query 'Role.Arn' --output text && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam put-role-policy --role-name notification-lambda-role \
  --policy-name notifier-inline --policy-document file:///app/build/policy-notifier.json
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role

Deploy rotator lambda

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda create-function \
  --function-name secrets-rotator \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role \
  --handler handler.handler \
  --zip-file fileb:///app/build/rotator.zip \
  --timeout 30 \
  --environment "Variables={SECRET_ID=app/db/password,AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566}" \
  --query '{Arn:FunctionArn,State:State}' --output json
output
{
    "Arn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "State": "Pending"
}

[stdout]
{
    "Arn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "State": "Pending"
}

Deploy notifier lambda

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda create-function \
  --function-name notification-lambda \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role \
  --handler handler.handler \
  --zip-file fileb:///app/build/notifier.zip \
  --timeout 30 \
  --query '{Arn:FunctionArn,State:State}' --output json
output
{
    "Arn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda",
    "State": "Pending"
}

[stdout]
{
    "Arn": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda",
    "State": "Pending"
}

Wait for lambdas active

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda wait function-active-v2 --function-name secrets-rotator && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda wait function-active-v2 --function-name notification-lambda && \
echo "both active"
output
both active

[stdout]
both active
Quick smoke test of the rotator directly (will also verify KMS perms + secret ARN pattern):

Smoke test rotator

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda invoke --function-name secrets-rotator --payload '{}' --cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out /tmp/out.json && \
cat /tmp/out.json && echo && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text && echo && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSPREVIOUS --query 'SecretString' --output text
output
{
    "StatusCode": 200,
    "ExecutedVersion": "$LATEST"
}
{"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217", "previousVersionId": "687d4b42-7279-4609-82b3-68e151deb50d"}
{"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}

{"username":"app","password":"initial-password-seed"}

[stdout]
{
    "StatusCode": 200,
    "ExecutedVersion": "$LATEST"
}
{"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217", "previousVersionId": "687d4b42-7279-4609-82b3-68e151deb50d"}
{"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}

{"username":"app","password":"initial-password-seed"}
Rotator works , AWSCURRENT updated, AWSPREVIOUS has the old seed. Now EventBridge bus + rule + lambda permission.
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s

Create custom EventBridge bus

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS events create-event-bus --name rotation-events --query 'EventBusArn' --output text
output
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events

[stdout]
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events
write · /app/build/event-pattern.json
{
  "source": ["rotation.pipeline"],
  "detail-type": ["RotationComplete"]
}

Create rule on custom bus

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS events put-rule \
  --name on-rotation-success \
  --event-bus-name rotation-events \
  --event-pattern file:///app/build/event-pattern.json \
  --state ENABLED \
  --query 'RuleArn' --output text
output
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/rotation-events/on-rotation-success

[stdout]
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/rotation-events/on-rotation-success

Wire rule target + lambda permission

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS events put-targets \
  --event-bus-name rotation-events \
  --rule on-rotation-success \
  --targets 'Id=notifier,Arn=arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda' \
  --query '{Failed:FailedEntryCount}' --output json && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS lambda add-permission \
  --function-name notification-lambda \
  --statement-id allow-eb-rotation-events \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal events.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/rotation-events/on-rotation-success \
  --query 'Statement' --output text | head -c 200
output
{
    "Failed": 0
}
{"Sid": "allow-eb-rotation-events", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction", "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda", "Principal": {"Service": "ev

[stdout]
{
    "Failed": 0
}
{"Sid": "allow-eb-rotation-events", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction", "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda", "Principal": {"Service": "ev
Quick check that the bus→rule→notifier path works end-to-end before building the SMs:

Probe event pipeline

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS events put-events --entries '[{"Source":"rotation.pipeline","DetailType":"RotationComplete","EventBusName":"rotation-events","Detail":"{\"secretId\":\"app/db/password\",\"newVersionId\":\"probe\"}"}]' --query '{Failed:FailedEntryCount}' --output json && \
sleep 3 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS logs describe-log-groups --log-group-name-prefix /aws/lambda/notification-lambda --query 'logGroups[].logGroupName' --output text && \
LG=/aws/lambda/notification-lambda && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS logs filter-log-events --log-group-name $LG --filter-pattern "notified" --query 'events[].message' --output text | tail
output
{
    "Failed": 0
}
/aws/lambda/notification-lambda
START RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=probe event={"version": "0", "id": "c377552a-8938-4bd2-9250-64234e60d470", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:49:53Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": [], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "probe"}}
	END RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25
	REPORT RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25	Duration: 11.06 ms	Billed Duration: 12 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB

[stdout]
{
    "Failed": 0
}
/aws/lambda/notification-lambda
START RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=probe event={"version": "0", "id": "c377552a-8938-4bd2-9250-64234e60d470", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:49:53Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": [], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "probe"}}
	END RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25
	REPORT RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25	Duration: 11.06 ms	Billed Duration: 12 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB
EventBridge path works and the `notified:` log line is emitted. Now the child SM and its least-privilege role.
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s
write · /app/build/policy-child.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "InvokeRotator",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "PutRotationEvents",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "events:PutEvents",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/child-sm.json
{
  "Comment": "Rotate secret then publish RotationComplete",
  "StartAt": "InvokeRotator",
  "States": {
    "InvokeRotator": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::lambda:invoke",
      "Parameters": {
        "FunctionName": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
        "Payload": {}
      },
      "ResultSelector": {
        "secretId.$": "$.Payload.secretId",
        "newVersionId.$": "$.Payload.newVersionId",
        "previousVersionId.$": "$.Payload.previousVersionId"
      },
      "ResultPath": "$.rotation",
      "Next": "PublishRotationComplete"
    },
    "PublishRotationComplete": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::events:putEvents",
      "Parameters": {
        "Entries": [
          {
            "EventBusName": "rotation-events",
            "Source": "rotation.pipeline",
            "DetailType": "RotationComplete",
            "Detail": {
              "secretId.$": "$.rotation.secretId",
              "newVersionId.$": "$.rotation.newVersionId",
              "previousVersionId.$": "$.rotation.previousVersionId"
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "End": true
    }
  }
}

Create child SM role

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam create-role --role-name rotation-child-role \
  --assume-role-policy-document file:///app/build/trust-states.json \
  --query 'Role.Arn' --output text && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam put-role-policy --role-name rotation-child-role \
  --policy-name child-inline --policy-document file:///app/build/policy-child.json
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role

Create child state machine

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions create-state-machine \
  --name rotation-child \
  --definition file:///app/build/child-sm.json \
  --role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role \
  --query 'stateMachineArn' --output text
output
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child

[stdout]
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child
Now the parent SM , role needs `states:*` on child + `events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule` for the managed `.sync:2` rule.
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s
write · /app/build/policy-parent.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "StartChild",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "states:StartExecution",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ControlChildExecutions",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "states:DescribeExecution",
        "states:StopExecution"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ManagedRuleForSyncChildInvocation",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "events:PutRule",
        "events:PutTargets",
        "events:DescribeRule"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/parent-sm.json
{
  "Comment": "Entrypoint state machine: delegates rotation to child SM and waits for completion",
  "StartAt": "RunChild",
  "States": {
    "RunChild": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::states:startExecution.sync:2",
      "Parameters": {
        "StateMachineArn": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child",
        "Input": {}
      },
      "End": true
    }
  }
}

Create parent SM + role

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam create-role --role-name rotation-orchestrator-role \
  --assume-role-policy-document file:///app/build/trust-states.json \
  --query 'Role.Arn' --output text && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS iam put-role-policy --role-name rotation-orchestrator-role \
  --policy-name parent-inline --policy-document file:///app/build/policy-parent.json && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions create-state-machine \
  --name rotation-orchestrator \
  --definition file:///app/build/parent-sm.json \
  --role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role \
  --query 'stateMachineArn' --output text
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator
All wired. Now the end-to-end verification: capture current AWSCURRENT password, start parent, wait for SUCCEEDED within 90s, check versions rotated and `notified:` log exists.
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s

Start parent + poll until terminal or 90s

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
BEFORE_CURRENT=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text) && \
echo "BEFORE AWSCURRENT: $BEFORE_CURRENT" && \
T0=$(date +%s) && \
EXEC_ARN=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions start-execution \
  --state-machine-arn arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator \
  --query 'executionArn' --output text) && \
echo "exec=$EXEC_ARN t0=$T0" && \
STATUS=RUNNING; \
while [ "$STATUS" = "RUNNING" ]; do \
  NOW=$(date +%s); ELAPSED=$((NOW-T0)); \
  if [ $ELAPSED -gt 90 ]; then echo "TIMEOUT at ${ELAPSED}s"; break; fi; \
  sleep 2; \
  STATUS=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions describe-execution --execution-arn $EXEC_ARN --query 'status' --output text); \
  echo "t=${ELAPSED}s status=$STATUS"; \
done && \
echo "FINAL=$STATUS"
output
BEFORE AWSCURRENT: {"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}
exec=arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-orchestrator:2b2bc842-2226-4c65-b8a1-0ead475a4dde t0=1776840662
t=1s status=SUCCEEDED
FINAL=SUCCEEDED

[stdout]
BEFORE AWSCURRENT: {"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}
exec=arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-orchestrator:2b2bc842-2226-4c65-b8a1-0ead475a4dde t0=1776840662
t=1s status=SUCCEEDED
FINAL=SUCCEEDED
Parent `SUCCEEDED` in ~1s. Now verify the secret rotated, AWSPREVIOUS moved, and `notified:` was logged.

Verify rotation + logs

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
echo "=== AWSCURRENT ===" && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text && \
echo "=== AWSPREVIOUS ===" && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSPREVIOUS --query 'SecretString' --output text && \
echo "=== VersionIdsToStages ===" && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages' --output json && \
echo "=== KmsKeyId on secret ===" && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'KmsKeyId' --output text && \
echo "=== Notifier logs (notified:) ===" && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS logs filter-log-events --log-group-name /aws/lambda/notification-lambda --filter-pattern '"notified:"' --query 'events[].message' --output text
output
=== AWSCURRENT ===
{"username": "app", "password": "6Oz0XzG3GA3N2M0IrTVUXEzrY2OE"}
=== AWSPREVIOUS ===
{"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}
=== VersionIdsToStages ===
{
    "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
=== KmsKeyId on secret ===
alias/app-rotation-key
=== Notifier logs (notified:) ===
START RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=probe event={"version": "0", "id": "c377552a-8938-4bd2-9250-64234e60d470", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:49:53Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": [], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "probe"}}
	END RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25
	REPORT RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25	Duration: 11.06 ms	Billed Duration: 12 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB	
	START RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93 event={"version": "0", "id": "52750665-0f0b-4c28-987a-63cee438b826", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:51:04Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": ["arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child", "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:a14fe65a-7c22-400c-adb9-2c52e07365d3"], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93", "previousVersionId": "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217"}}
	END RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193
	REPORT RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193	Duration: 9.58 ms	Billed Duration: 10 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB

[stdout]
=== AWSCURRENT ===
{"username": "app", "password": "6Oz0XzG3GA3N2M0IrTVUXEzrY2OE"}
=== AWSPREVIOUS ===
{"username": "app", "password": "nWb5pt0n2EOUbDtTWcCY2seupWZq"}
=== VersionIdsToStages ===
{
    "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
=== KmsKeyId on secret ===
alias/app-rotation-key
=== Notifier logs (notified:) ===
START RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=probe event={"version": "0", "id": "c377552a-8938-4bd2-9250-64234e60d470", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:49:53Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": [], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "probe"}}
	END RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25
	REPORT RequestId: 867272c8-9243-4afc-a8bb-156057102e25	Duration: 11.06 ms	Billed Duration: 12 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB	
	START RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193 Version: $LATEST
	notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93 event={"version": "0", "id": "52750665-0f0b-4c28-987a-63cee438b826", "detail-type": "RotationComplete", "source": "rotation.pipeline", "account": "000000000000", "time": "2026-04-22T06:51:04Z", "region": "us-east-1", "resources": ["arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child", "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:a14fe65a-7c22-400c-adb9-2c52e07365d3"], "detail": {"secretId": "app/db/password", "newVersionId": "c4d22d28-be6f-49c7-90ae-a84299fa8a93", "previousVersionId": "cd060fdf-ee52-4189-812c-f4281f993217"}}
	END RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193
	REPORT RequestId: 81712371-9224-4faa-a9e8-00052f02a193	Duration: 9.58 ms	Billed Duration: 10 ms	Memory Size: 128 MB	Max Memory Used: 128 MB
Confirming two consecutive rotations produce different passwords (spec requirement):

Second rotation: confirm password changes

shell
export LS=http://localstack:4566 && \
P1=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text) && \
aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions start-execution \
  --state-machine-arn arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator \
  --query 'executionArn' --output text > /tmp/exec2 && \
sleep 3 && \
STATUS=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS stepfunctions describe-execution --execution-arn $(cat /tmp/exec2) --query 'status' --output text) && \
P2=$(aws --endpoint-url=$LS secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text) && \
echo "parent#2=$STATUS"; echo "P1=$P1"; echo "P2=$P2"; \
[ "$P1" != "$P2" ] && echo "DIFF: ok" || echo "DIFF: FAIL"
output
parent#2=SUCCEEDED
P1={"username": "app", "password": "6Oz0XzG3GA3N2M0IrTVUXEzrY2OE"}
P2={"username": "app", "password": "86Ktk4AMNNoHmPCW39XbkBEoDktq"}
DIFF: ok

[stdout]
parent#2=SUCCEEDED
P1={"username": "app", "password": "6Oz0XzG3GA3N2M0IrTVUXEzrY2OE"}
P2={"username": "app", "password": "86Ktk4AMNNoHmPCW39XbkBEoDktq"}
DIFF: ok
  • Create KMS key + alias and encrypt secret app/db/password
  • Write and deploy rotator lambda (secrets-rotator) and notification lambda
  • Create least-privilege IAM roles for both lambdas
  • Create EventBridge custom bus + rule → notification lambda
  • Create child SM (rotation-child) with least-privilege role
  • Create parent SM (rotation-orchestrator) with role including events perms for managed-rule
  • Verify end-to-end rotation flow within 90s
Pipeline is up and verified. Summary: **Resources (exact names):** - Secret `app/db/password` , CMK-encrypted with `alias/app-rotation-key` - Lambdas `secrets-rotator` (runtime python3.11) and `notification-lambda` (python3.11) - Roles `secrets-rotator-role`, `notification-lambda-role`, `rotation-child-role`, `rotation-orchestrator-role` - EventBridge bus `rotation-events` + rule `on-rotation-success` (pattern: `source=rotation.pipeline`, `detail-type=RotationComplete`) → targets `notification-lambda` - State machines `rotation-child` and `rotation-orchestrator` **Flow shape:** parent `rotation-orchestrator` has a single task using `arn:aws:states:::states:startExecution.sync:2` against `rotation-child`. Child runs `lambda:invoke` (rotator) → `events:putEvents` (bus `rotation-events`, `source=rotation.pipeline`, `detail-type=RotationComplete`). The rule routes to `notification-lambda`, which is never invoked directly by the child. **Least-privilege highlights (no wildcards on actions/resources):** - `secrets-rotator-role`: `Describe/Get/Put/UpdateSecretVersionStage` only on `secret:app/db/password-*`; `kms:Decrypt`/`GenerateDataKey` only on the CMK ARN; logs scoped to `/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator`. - `notification-lambda-role`: logs only, scoped to `/aws/lambda/notification-lambda`. - `rotation-child-role`: `lambda:InvokeFunction` on rotator ARN; `events:PutEvents` on the `rotation-events` bus ARN. - `rotation-orchestrator-role`: `states:StartExecution` on child SM ARN; `Describe/StopExecution` on `execution:rotation-child:*`; `events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule` scoped to `rule/StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule` (the managed rule required by `.sync:2`). **Verification results:** - Parent execution `SUCCEEDED` ~1s after `start-execution` (well under 90s). - `AWSCURRENT` password changed: `initial-password-seed` → `nWb5pt0n...` → `6Oz0XzG3...` → `86Ktk4AM...`; `AWSPREVIOUS` holds the prior current. - Two consecutive orchestrator runs produced different passwords. - `notification-lambda` logged `notified: rotation complete for app/db/password version=c4d22d28-...` with the child SM's execution ARN in `resources[]`, confirming the event came through the bus from the child SM (not a direct invoke).
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/HEJl1MGEHORblBsDOmqkw/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 15 items

../tests/test_state.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real PASSED               [  6%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_localstack_reachable PASSED                 [ 13%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk PASSED  [ 20%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists PASSED               [ 26%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_exists PASSED           [ 33%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_and_child_state_machines_exist PASSED [ 40%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_event_bus_and_rule_exist PASSED             [ 46%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rule_target_points_at_notification_lambda PASSED [ 53%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_role_grants_kms_actions PASSED      [ 60%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_rotator_role FAILED   [ 66%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke FAILED [ 73%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms FAILED [ 80%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish FAILED    [ 86%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_allows_eventbridge_invoke PASSED [ 93%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_end_to_end_parent_execution_rotates_and_notifies PASSED [100%]

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
___________________ test_kms_key_policy_grants_rotator_role ____________________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffff8a8cdb50>
kms = <botocore.client.KMS object at 0xffff8ae18350>

    def test_kms_key_policy_grants_rotator_role(iam, kms):
        role_arn = iam.get_role(RoleName=ROTATOR_ROLE)["Role"]["Arn"]
        policy_str = kms.get_key_policy(KeyId=KEY_ALIAS, PolicyName="default")[
            "Policy"
        ]
        policy = json.loads(policy_str)
        match = False
        for st in policy.get("Statement", []):
            if st.get("Effect") != "Allow":
                continue
            principal = st.get("Principal") or {}
            if not isinstance(principal, dict):
                continue
            arns = set(_normalise_list(principal.get("AWS")))
            if role_arn not in arns:
                continue
            actions = set(_normalise_list(st.get("Action")))
            if _actions_cover(actions, REQUIRED_KMS_ACTIONS):
                match = True
                break
>       assert match, (
            f"KMS key policy on {KEY_ALIAS} has no Allow statement whose "
            f"Principal.AWS includes {role_arn} and whose Action covers "
            f"{sorted(REQUIRED_KMS_ACTIONS)}. Key policy: {policy_str}"
        )
E       AssertionError: KMS key policy on alias/app-rotation-key has no Allow statement whose Principal.AWS includes arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role and whose Action covers ['kms:Decrypt', 'kms:GenerateDataKey']. Key policy: {"Version": "2012-10-17", "Id": "key-default-1", "Statement": [{"Sid": "Enable IAM User Permissions", "Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"}, "Action": "kms:*", "Resource": "*"}]}
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:322: AssertionError
_______________ test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke _______________

lmb = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffff8ae19b80>

    def test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke(lmb):
        try:
            policy_doc = json.loads(
>               lmb.get_policy(FunctionName=ROTATOR_FUNCTION)["Policy"]
                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
            )

/tests/test_state.py:332: 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
/root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/HEJl1MGEHORblBsDOmqkw/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/client.py:569: in _api_call
    return self._make_api_call(operation_name, kwargs)
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

self = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffff8ae19b80>
operation_name = 'GetPolicy', api_params = {'FunctionName': 'secrets-rotator'}

    def _make_api_call(self, operation_name, api_params):
        operation_model = self._service_model.operation_model(operation_name)
        service_name = self._service_model.service_name
        history_recorder.record(
            'API_CALL',
            {
                'service': service_name,
                'operation': operation_name,
                'params': api_params,
            },
        )
        if operation_model.deprecated:
            logger.debug(
                'Warning: %s.%s() is deprecated', service_name, operation_name
            )
        request_context = {
            'client_region': self.meta.region_name,
            'client_config': self.meta.config,
            'has_streaming_input': operation_model.has_streaming_input,
            'auth_type': operation_model.resolved_auth_type,
            'unsigned_payload': operation_model.unsigned_payload,
        }
    
        api_params = self._emit_api_params(
            api_params=api_params,
            operation_model=operation_model,
            context=request_context,
        )
        (
            endpoint_url,
            additional_headers,
            properties,
        ) = self._resolve_endpoint_ruleset(
            operation_model, api_params, request_context
        )
        if properties:
            # Pass arbitrary endpoint info with the Request
            # for use during construction.
            request_context['endpoint_properties'] = properties
        request_dict = self._convert_to_request_dict(
            api_params=api_params,
            operation_model=operation_model,
            endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
            context=request_context,
            headers=additional_headers,
        )
        resolve_checksum_context(request_dict, operation_model, api_params)
    
        service_id = self._service_model.service_id.hyphenize()
        handler, event_response = self.meta.events.emit_until_response(
            f'before-call.{service_id}.{operation_name}',
            model=operation_model,
            params=request_dict,
            request_signer=self._request_signer,
            context=request_context,
        )
    
        if event_response is not None:
            http, parsed_response = event_response
        else:
            maybe_compress_request(
                self.meta.config, request_dict, operation_model
            )
            apply_request_checksum(request_dict)
            http, parsed_response = self._make_request(
                operation_model, request_dict, request_context
            )
    
        self.meta.events.emit(
            f'after-call.{service_id}.{operation_name}',
            http_response=http,
            parsed=parsed_response,
            model=operation_model,
            context=request_context,
        )
    
        if http.status_code >= 300:
            error_info = parsed_response.get("Error", {})
            error_code = error_info.get("QueryErrorCode") or error_info.get(
                "Code"
            )
            error_class = self.exceptions.from_code(error_code)
>           raise error_class(parsed_response, operation_name)
E           botocore.errorfactory.ResourceNotFoundException: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

/root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/HEJl1MGEHORblBsDOmqkw/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/client.py:1023: ResourceNotFoundException

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

lmb = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffff8ae19b80>

    def test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke(lmb):
        try:
            policy_doc = json.loads(
                lmb.get_policy(FunctionName=ROTATOR_FUNCTION)["Policy"]
            )
        except ClientError as e:
>           pytest.fail(
                f"Lambda {ROTATOR_FUNCTION} has no resource-based policy , "
                f"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com cannot invoke it: {e}"
            )
E           Failed: Lambda secrets-rotator has no resource-based policy , secretsmanager.amazonaws.com cannot invoke it: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

/tests/test_state.py:335: Failed
_______________ test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms _______________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffff8a8cdb50>

    def test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms(iam):
        """The .sync:2 integration registers an EventBridge-managed callback
        rule. Parent role needs events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule plus
        full states:* on the child."""
        found_events = False
        found_states = False
        for _pname, st in _inline_statements(iam, PARENT_ROLE):
            actions = set(_normalise_list(st.get("Action")))
            if _actions_cover(actions, REQUIRED_PARENT_EVENTS_ACTIONS):
                found_events = True
            if _actions_cover(actions, REQUIRED_PARENT_STATES_ACTIONS):
                found_states = True
        assert found_events, (
            f"{PARENT_ROLE} missing events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule. "
            f".sync:2 uses an EventBridge-managed callback rule; without "
            f"these the parent cannot set up the callback."
        )
>       assert found_states, (
            f"{PARENT_ROLE} missing states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/"
            f"StopExecution. .sync:2 requires all three on the child SM."
        )
E       AssertionError: rotation-orchestrator-role missing states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/StopExecution. .sync:2 requires all three on the child SM.
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:377: AssertionError
____________________ test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish ____________________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffff8a8cdb50>

    def test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish(iam):
        found_rotate = False
        found_putevents = False
        for _pname, st in _inline_statements(iam, CHILD_ROLE):
            actions = set(_normalise_list(st.get("Action")))
            if _actions_cover(actions, {"secretsmanager:RotateSecret"}):
                found_rotate = True
            if _actions_cover(actions, {"events:PutEvents"}):
                found_putevents = True
>       assert found_rotate, (
            f"{CHILD_ROLE} lacks secretsmanager:RotateSecret , the child "
            f"state machine cannot trigger rotation."
        )
E       AssertionError: rotation-child-role lacks secretsmanager:RotateSecret , the child state machine cannot trigger rotation.
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:392: AssertionError
=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_state.py: 33 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/HEJl1MGEHORblBsDOmqkw/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_localstack_reachable
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk
PASSED ../tests/test_

… (truncated at 12,000 chars, full verifier log is in the trial artifacts)

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_7d45ce28f5be466e. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_7d45ce28f5be466e · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.