SyncValsverifier → artifact → classifier → verdict
SyncVals · Trajectory

sfn-secrets-rotation-chain

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✗ failed GOOD_FAILURE ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
GOOD_FAILUREHonest miss, the agent ran correctly but couldn't solve it. Expected for a hard task; the task is sound.
SubtypeIncomplete Implementation
EvidenceTest output shows 12 passed, 3 failed:\n\n1. test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke FAILED: 'Lambda secrets-rotator has no resource-based policy , secretsmanager.amazonaws.com cannot invoke it'\n\n2. test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms FAILED: 'rotation-orchestrator-role missing states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/StopExecution. .sync:2 requires all three on the child SM.'\n\n3. test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish FAILED: 'rotation-child-role lacks secretsmanager:RotateSecret , the child state machine cannot trigger rotation.'\n\nCritically: test_end_to_end_parent_execution_rotates_and_notifies PASSED, confirming the system architecture and execution flow work correctly. The failures are specifically about IAM policy details, not fundamental misunderstanding.
Root causeThe agent implemented the core infrastructure correctly and achieved end-to-end functionality, but failed to add all required IAM resource-based policies and role permissions. Specifically: (1) did not add secretsmanager service principal resource-based policy to the rotator lambda, (2) did not include states:* permissions on the parent orchestrator role (only events:* perms), and (3) did not ensure child role has secretsmanager:RotateSecret. These requirements were explicitly stated in the instruction (lines 40-41) but required meticulous IAM configuration.
RecommendationN/A - task is fine. The instruction clearly states the IAM requirements including the specific need for states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/StopExecution on the parent role (line 40) and the least-privilege principle (line 18). The agent simply did not fully implement these specified details despite the guidance being explicit in the instruction."
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
48 tool calls · 4 tool types · 57 steps
ok so we need a secrets rotation pipeline on localstack and right now the box is empty. localstack is at `http://localstack:4566`, creds are already exported (`AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, same for secret, region `us-east-1`), you've got `aws`, `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`, `zip`, `curl`. build the whole thing. the app reads its db password from secrets manager. we need it rotatable on demand via step functions, and every successful rotation has to notify a downstream lambda. no humans in the loop. shape of it: - a parent state machine is the only entry point. it doesn't do the actual work , it hands off to a child SM and waits for it to finish. - the child SM does two things: kicks off rotation, then puts a `RotationComplete` event onto a custom eventbridge bus. - a rule on that bus routes to a notification lambda. the notification lambda isn't invoked directly by the child , it rides the bus. - the secret is encrypted with a customer-managed KMS key. not the aws-managed one, please. done looks like this: one `start-execution` on the parent (no input), and within 90s: - parent hits `SUCCEEDED` - `AWSCURRENT` on the secret moves to a new version, the string actually changes, old one gets `AWSPREVIOUS` - the notification lambda writes a log line that starts with `notified:` also: least privilege. the verifier reads policy docs directly, not just "does it work end-to-end". don't wildcard your way out. names the verifier grabs by hand, use them exactly: | thing | name | |-|-| | secret | `app/db/password` | | kms alias | `alias/app-rotation-key` | | rotator lambda | `secrets-rotator` | | rotator lambda role | `secrets-rotator-role` | | notification lambda | `notification-lambda` | | parent SM | `rotation-orchestrator` | | parent SM role | `rotation-orchestrator-role` | | child SM | `rotation-child` | | child SM role | `rotation-child-role` | | eventbridge bus | `rotation-events` | | eventbridge rule | `on-rotation-success` | rule pattern: `source` = `rotation.pipeline`, `detail-type` = `RotationComplete`. python3.11 for both lambdas. they run on the shared compose network so `http://localstack:4566` is reachable from inside them. localstack community 4.13.1. pick any password generator you like , just make sure two consecutive rotations produce different strings. one heads-up on the parent → child handoff: Step Functions implements `StartExecution.sync:2` by creating an EventBridge managed rule behind the scenes to notify the parent when the child finishes. That means the parent SM's execution role needs `events:PutRule`, `events:PutTargets`, `events:DescribeRule` in addition to the usual `states:StartExecution` / `states:DescribeExecution` / `states:StopExecution` on the child. Without those events perms the parent will fail with "not authorized to create managed-rule".

Check working directory and localstack health

shell
ls /app && echo "---" && curl -s http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | head -100
output
---
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "available", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disabled", "route53": "disabled", "route53resolver": "disabled", "s3": "available", "s3control": "disabled", "scheduler": "disabled", "secretsmanager": "available", "ses": "disabled", "sns": "disabled", "sqs": "disabled", "ssm": "disabled", "stepfunctions": "available", "sts": "available", "support": "disabled", "swf": "disabled", "transcribe": "disabled"}, "edition": "community", "version": "4.13.1"}

[stdout]
---
{"services": {"acm": "disabled", "apigateway": "disabled", "cloudformation": "disabled", "cloudwatch": "disabled", "config": "disabled", "dynamodb": "disabled", "dynamodbstreams": "disabled", "ec2": "disabled", "es": "disabled", "events": "available", "firehose": "disabled", "iam": "available", "kinesis": "disabled", "kms": "available", "lambda": "available", "logs": "available", "opensearch": "disabled", "redshift": "disabled", "resource-groups": "disabled", "resourcegroupstaggingapi": "disabled", "route53": "disabled", "route53resolver": "disabled", "s3": "available", "s3control": "disabled", "scheduler": "disabled", "secretsmanager": "available", "ses": "disabled", "sns": "disabled", "sqs": "disabled", "ssm": "disabled", "stepfunctions": "available", "sts": "available", "support": "disabled", "swf": "disabled", "transcribe": "disabled"}, "edition": "community", "version": "4.13.1"}

Check tool versions

shell
aws --version && python3 --version && which jq zip curl
output
aws-cli/2.34.33 Python/3.14.4 Linux/6.10.14-linuxkit exe/aarch64.ubuntu.24
Python 3.12.3
/usr/bin/jq
/usr/bin/zip
/usr/bin/curl

[stdout]
aws-cli/2.34.33 Python/3.14.4 Linux/6.10.14-linuxkit exe/aarch64.ubuntu.24
Python 3.12.3
/usr/bin/jq
/usr/bin/zip
/usr/bin/curl

Verify AWS CLI works against localstack

shell
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566 && aws sts get-caller-identity
output
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}

[stdout]
{
    "UserId": "AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE",
    "Account": "000000000000",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"
}
I'll build this step by step. Let me set up a workspace and lay down the pieces.

Create build workspace

shell
mkdir -p /app/build && cd /app/build && ls
output
(Bash completed with no output)
write · /app/build/rotator.py
import os
import json
import secrets
import string
import boto3

ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("AWS_ENDPOINT_URL", "http://localstack:4566")

sm = boto3.client("secretsmanager", endpoint_url=ENDPOINT)


def _new_password(length=32):
    alphabet = string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "-_"
    return "".join(secrets.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(length))


def handler(event, context):
    secret_id = event["SecretId"]
    new_value = _new_password()
    put = sm.put_secret_value(
        SecretId=secret_id,
        SecretString=json.dumps({"password": new_value}),
    )
    return {
        "SecretId": secret_id,
        "VersionId": put["VersionId"],
    }
write · /app/build/notifier.py
import json


def handler(event, context):
    detail = event.get("detail", {})
    secret_id = detail.get("SecretId", "?")
    version_id = detail.get("VersionId", "?")
    print(f"notified: rotation complete secret={secret_id} version={version_id}")
    return {"ok": True}

Package lambda zips

shell
zip -q rotator.zip rotator.py && zip -q notifier.zip notifier.py && ls -la *.zip
output
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 336 Apr 22 06:56 notifier.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 534 Apr 22 06:56 rotator.zip

[stdout]
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 336 Apr 22 06:56 notifier.zip
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 534 Apr 22 06:56 rotator.zip

Confirm build directory

shell
pwd
output
/app/build

[stdout]
/app/build
Now let me create the KMS key, secret, IAM roles and policies. I'll do this in a single orchestrated script so it's replayable.
write · /app/build/env.sh
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566
export AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
export AWS_REGION=us-east-1
export ACCOUNT_ID=000000000000
ToolSearch
{
  "query": "select:TodoWrite",
  "max_results": 1
}

, output, 
{"type": "tool_reference", "tool_name": "TodoWrite"}
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
write · /app/build/kms-policy.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "RootAccountAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root"},
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsManagerUse",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "secretsmanager.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:Encrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "RotatorLambdaUse",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role"},
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}

Create KMS key + alias

shell
source env.sh && \
  KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key --description "app rotation cmk" --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT --policy file://kms-policy.json --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text) && \
  echo "KEY_ID=$KEY_ID" && \
  aws kms create-alias --alias-name alias/app-rotation-key --target-key-id $KEY_ID && \
  echo "$KEY_ID" > .key_id
output
KEY_ID=2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263

[stdout]
KEY_ID=2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263

Create secret encrypted with CMK

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws secretsmanager create-secret \
    --name app/db/password \
    --kms-key-id alias/app-rotation-key \
    --secret-string '{"password":"initial-placeholder"}' \
    --query 'ARN' --output text > .secret_arn && \
  cat .secret_arn
output
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-dvLUCR

[stdout]
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-dvLUCR
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification

Create custom EventBridge bus

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws events create-event-bus --name rotation-events --query 'EventBusArn' --output text > .bus_arn && \
  cat .bus_arn
output
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events

[stdout]
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events
Now the rotator lambda + role.
write · /app/build/lambda-trust.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
}

Read saved ARNs

shell
source env.sh && cat .secret_arn && echo && cat .key_id
output
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-dvLUCR

2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263

[stdout]
arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-dvLUCR

2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263
write · /app/build/rotator-policy.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "Logs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogGroup",
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "RotateSecret",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "KmsForSecret",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/KEY_ID_PLACEHOLDER"
    }
  ]
}

Create rotator role + inline policy

shell
source env.sh && \
  KEY_ID=$(cat .key_id) && \
  sed -i "s|KEY_ID_PLACEHOLDER|$KEY_ID|" rotator-policy.json && \
  aws iam create-role --role-name secrets-rotator-role --assume-role-policy-document file://lambda-trust.json --query 'Role.Arn' --output text > .rotator_role_arn && \
  aws iam put-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name rotator-inline --policy-document file://rotator-policy.json && \
  cat .rotator_role_arn
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role

Create rotator lambda

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws lambda create-function \
    --function-name secrets-rotator \
    --runtime python3.11 \
    --role arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role \
    --handler rotator.handler \
    --timeout 30 \
    --environment 'Variables={AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localstack:4566}' \
    --zip-file fileb://rotator.zip \
    --query 'FunctionArn' --output text > .rotator_arn && \
  cat .rotator_arn
output
arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator

[stdout]
arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator

Wait for rotator to be Active

shell
source env.sh && \
  for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
    STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name secrets-rotator --query 'Configuration.State' --output text); \
    echo "state=$STATE"; \
    [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break; \
    sleep 1; \
  done
output
state=Active

[stdout]
state=Active
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
write · /app/build/notifier-policy.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "Logs",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "logs:CreateLogGroup",
        "logs:CreateLogStream",
        "logs:PutLogEvents"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/notification-lambda:*"
    }
  ]
}

Create notification lambda + role

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws iam create-role --role-name notification-lambda-role --assume-role-policy-document file://lambda-trust.json --query 'Role.Arn' --output text && \
  aws iam put-role-policy --role-name notification-lambda-role --policy-name notifier-inline --policy-document file://notifier-policy.json && \
  aws lambda create-function \
    --function-name notification-lambda \
    --runtime python3.11 \
    --role arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role \
    --handler notifier.handler \
    --timeout 15 \
    --zip-file fileb://notifier.zip \
    --query 'FunctionArn' --output text > .notifier_arn && \
  cat .notifier_arn
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role
arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/notification-lambda-role
arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:notification-lambda

Wait for notifier active

shell
source env.sh && \
  for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do \
    STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name notification-lambda --query 'Configuration.State' --output text); \
    [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && { echo "ready"; break; }; \
    sleep 1; \
  done
output
ready

[stdout]
ready
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
write · /app/build/rule-pattern.json
{"source":["rotation.pipeline"],"detail-type":["RotationComplete"]}

Create EB rule + lambda permission + target

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws events put-rule \
    --name on-rotation-success \
    --event-bus-name rotation-events \
    --event-pattern file://rule-pattern.json \
    --state ENABLED \
    --query 'RuleArn' --output text > .rule_arn && \
  cat .rule_arn && \
  aws lambda add-permission \
    --function-name notification-lambda \
    --statement-id allow-rule-on-rotation-success \
    --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
    --principal events.amazonaws.com \
    --source-arn "$(cat .rule_arn)" \
    --query 'Statement' --output text > /dev/null && \
  aws events put-targets \
    --rule on-rotation-success \
    --event-bus-name rotation-events \
    --targets "Id=1,Arn=$(cat .notifier_arn)"
output
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/rotation-events/on-rotation-success
{
    "FailedEntryCount": 0,
    "FailedEntries": []
}

[stdout]
arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/rotation-events/on-rotation-success
{
    "FailedEntryCount": 0,
    "FailedEntries": []
}
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
write · /app/build/sfn-trust.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": {"Service": "states.amazonaws.com"},
      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
    }
  ]
}
write · /app/build/child-sm.json
{
  "Comment": "Rotate secret then emit RotationComplete event",
  "StartAt": "Rotate",
  "States": {
    "Rotate": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::lambda:invoke",
      "Parameters": {
        "FunctionName": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
        "Payload": {
          "SecretId": "app/db/password"
        }
      },
      "ResultPath": "$.rotation",
      "Next": "Notify"
    },
    "Notify": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::events:putEvents",
      "Parameters": {
        "Entries": [
          {
            "EventBusName": "rotation-events",
            "Source": "rotation.pipeline",
            "DetailType": "RotationComplete",
            "Detail": {
              "SecretId.$": "$.rotation.Payload.SecretId",
              "VersionId.$": "$.rotation.Payload.VersionId"
            }
          }
        ]
      },
      "End": true
    }
  }
}
write · /app/build/child-sm-policy.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "InvokeRotator",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "PutEventsOnBus",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "events:PutEvents",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events"
    }
  ]
}

Create child SM role

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws iam create-role --role-name rotation-child-role --assume-role-policy-document file://sfn-trust.json --query 'Role.Arn' --output text > .child_role_arn && \
  aws iam put-role-policy --role-name rotation-child-role --policy-name child-inline --policy-document file://child-sm-policy.json && \
  cat .child_role_arn
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role

Create child state machine

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws stepfunctions create-state-machine \
    --name rotation-child \
    --definition file://child-sm.json \
    --role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-child-role \
    --type STANDARD \
    --query 'stateMachineArn' --output text > .child_sm_arn && \
  cat .child_sm_arn
output
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child

[stdout]
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
write · /app/build/parent-sm.json
{
  "Comment": "Hands off to the child rotation SM and waits for completion",
  "StartAt": "InvokeChild",
  "States": {
    "InvokeChild": {
      "Type": "Task",
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:::states:startExecution.sync:2",
      "Parameters": {
        "StateMachineArn": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child",
        "Input": {}
      },
      "End": true
    }
  }
}
write · /app/build/parent-sm-policy.json
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "StartAndControlChild",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "states:StartExecution"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "DescribeStopChildExecutions",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "states:DescribeExecution",
        "states:StopExecution"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "ManagedRuleForSyncInvoke",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "events:PutRule",
        "events:PutTargets",
        "events:DescribeRule"
      ],
      "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule"
    }
  ]
}

Create parent SM role

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws iam create-role --role-name rotation-orchestrator-role --assume-role-policy-document file://sfn-trust.json --query 'Role.Arn' --output text > .parent_role_arn && \
  aws iam put-role-policy --role-name rotation-orchestrator-role --policy-name parent-inline --policy-document file://parent-sm-policy.json && \
  cat .parent_role_arn
output
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role

[stdout]
arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role

Create parent state machine

shell
source env.sh && \
  aws stepfunctions create-state-machine \
    --name rotation-orchestrator \
    --definition file://parent-sm.json \
    --role-arn arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/rotation-orchestrator-role \
    --type STANDARD \
    --query 'stateMachineArn' --output text > .parent_sm_arn && \
  cat .parent_sm_arn
output
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator

[stdout]
arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-orchestrator
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
Now the end-to-end test. Start a parent execution with no input and watch for SUCCEEDED within 90s.

Start parent execution

shell
source env.sh && \
  BEFORE=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query SecretString --output text) && \
  echo "before: $BEFORE" && \
  EXEC_ARN=$(aws stepfunctions start-execution --state-machine-arn $(cat .parent_sm_arn) --query 'executionArn' --output text) && \
  echo "exec: $EXEC_ARN" && \
  echo "$EXEC_ARN" > .exec_arn
output
before: {"password":"initial-placeholder"}
exec: arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-orchestrator:a1e51b31-6337-4f75-846a-157fc85b022c

[stdout]
before: {"password":"initial-placeholder"}
exec: arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-orchestrator:a1e51b31-6337-4f75-846a-157fc85b022c

Poll execution status up to 90s

shell
source env.sh && \
  EXEC_ARN=$(cat .exec_arn) && \
  START=$(date +%s) && \
  while :; do \
    STATUS=$(aws stepfunctions describe-execution --execution-arn "$EXEC_ARN" --query status --output text); \
    NOW=$(date +%s); \
    echo "t=$((NOW-START))s status=$STATUS"; \
    [ "$STATUS" != "RUNNING" ] && break; \
    [ $((NOW-START)) -ge 90 ] && { echo "TIMEOUT"; break; }; \
    sleep 2; \
  done
output
t=1s status=SUCCEEDED

[stdout]
t=1s status=SUCCEEDED

Verify secret version stages

shell
source env.sh && \
  echo "== current ==" && \
  aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query '[VersionId,SecretString]' --output text && \
  echo "== previous ==" && \
  aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSPREVIOUS --query '[VersionId,SecretString]' --output text && \
  echo "== versions ==" && \
  aws secretsmanager list-secret-version-ids --secret-id app/db/password --query 'Versions[].[VersionId,VersionStages]' --output text
output
== current ==
b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d	{"password": "9jfpPrmOZVtXSHvLlEPdhsEj5nFORfHf"}
== previous ==
60f16566-c9d4-497b-a77d-aca07e1a6596	{"password":"initial-placeholder"}
== versions ==
b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d
AWSCURRENT
60f16566-c9d4-497b-a77d-aca07e1a6596
AWSPREVIOUS

[stdout]
== current ==
b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d	{"password": "9jfpPrmOZVtXSHvLlEPdhsEj5nFORfHf"}
== previous ==
60f16566-c9d4-497b-a77d-aca07e1a6596	{"password":"initial-placeholder"}
== versions ==
b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d
AWSCURRENT
60f16566-c9d4-497b-a77d-aca07e1a6596
AWSPREVIOUS
Secret rotated and stages moved. Now verify notification lambda log line.

Check notification lambda logs

shell
source env.sh && \
  for i in $(seq 1 15); do \
    LINES=$(aws logs tail /aws/lambda/notification-lambda --since 5m 2>/dev/null | grep -c '^.*notified:' || true); \
    echo "attempt=$i lines=$LINES"; \
    [ "$LINES" -ge 1 ] && break; \
    sleep 2; \
  done && \
  echo "---" && \
  aws logs tail /aws/lambda/notification-lambda --since 5m | grep 'notified:'
output
attempt=1 lines=1
---
2026-04-22T07:00:47.676000+00:00 2026/04/22/[$LATEST]396b28b992170ff16a630cf3399e223a notified: rotation complete secret=app/db/password version=b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d

[stdout]
attempt=1 lines=1
---
2026-04-22T07:00:47.676000+00:00 2026/04/22/[$LATEST]396b28b992170ff16a630cf3399e223a notified: rotation complete secret=app/db/password version=b6a86b83-4ac4-4ce5-b62a-712417e4b85d
All three acceptance criteria met. Let me also verify a second rotation produces a different password (the "two consecutive rotations produce different strings" requirement).

Second rotation and differ-check

shell
source env.sh && \
  EXEC2=$(aws stepfunctions start-execution --state-machine-arn $(cat .parent_sm_arn) --query 'executionArn' --output text) && \
  while :; do \
    S=$(aws stepfunctions describe-execution --execution-arn "$EXEC2" --query status --output text); \
    [ "$S" != "RUNNING" ] && { echo "status=$S"; break; }; \
    sleep 1; \
  done && \
  echo "== current after 2nd rotation ==" && \
  aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSCURRENT --query 'SecretString' --output text && \
  echo "== previous (should be first-rotation value) ==" && \
  aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --version-stage AWSPREVIOUS --query 'SecretString' --output text
output
status=SUCCEEDED
== current after 2nd rotation ==
{"password": "_dbzFp032UGA6vsrTasqDNu0kN5HJD1r"}
== previous (should be first-rotation value) ==
{"password": "9jfpPrmOZVtXSHvLlEPdhsEj5nFORfHf"}

[stdout]
status=SUCCEEDED
== current after 2nd rotation ==
{"password": "_dbzFp032UGA6vsrTasqDNu0kN5HJD1r"}
== previous (should be first-rotation value) ==
{"password": "9jfpPrmOZVtXSHvLlEPdhsEj5nFORfHf"}
Passwords differ across consecutive rotations. Let me sanity-check the least-privilege policies the verifier will inspect.

Dump role policy docs for verifier review

shell
source env.sh && \
  echo "== rotator role inline =="; \
  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name rotator-inline --query 'PolicyDocument' --output json; \
  echo "== child SM role inline =="; \
  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name rotation-child-role --policy-name child-inline --query 'PolicyDocument' --output json; \
  echo "== parent SM role inline =="; \
  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name rotation-orchestrator-role --policy-name parent-inline --query 'PolicyDocument' --output json; \
  echo "== notifier role inline =="; \
  aws iam get-role-policy --role-name notification-lambda-role --policy-name notifier-inline --query 'PolicyDocument' --output json
output
== rotator role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Logs",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "logs:CreateLogGroup",
                "logs:CreateLogStream",
                "logs:PutLogEvents"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "RotateSecret",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "KmsForSecret",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "kms:Decrypt",
                "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                "kms:DescribeKey"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263"
        }
    ]
}
== child SM role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "InvokeRotator",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "PutEventsOnBus",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "events:PutEvents",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events"
        }
    ]
}
== parent SM role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "StartAndControlChild",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "states:StartExecution"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DescribeStopChildExecutions",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "states:DescribeExecution",
                "states:StopExecution"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "ManagedRuleForSyncInvoke",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "events:PutRule",
                "events:PutTargets",
                "events:DescribeRule"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule"
        }
    ]
}
== notifier role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Logs",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "logs:CreateLogGroup",
                "logs:CreateLogStream",
                "logs:PutLogEvents"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/notification-lambda:*"
        }
    ]
}

[stdout]
== rotator role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Logs",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "logs:CreateLogGroup",
                "logs:CreateLogStream",
                "logs:PutLogEvents"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/secrets-rotator:*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "RotateSecret",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "KmsForSecret",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "kms:Decrypt",
                "kms:GenerateDataKey",
                "kms:DescribeKey"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/2efc9431-2ba0-47b1-aefc-c4e676454263"
        }
    ]
}
== child SM role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "InvokeRotator",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "lambda:InvokeFunction",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "PutEventsOnBus",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": "events:PutEvents",
            "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:event-bus/rotation-events"
        }
    ]
}
== parent SM role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "StartAndControlChild",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "states:StartExecution"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:stateMachine:rotation-child"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "DescribeStopChildExecutions",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "states:DescribeExecution",
                "states:StopExecution"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:states:us-east-1:000000000000:execution:rotation-child:*"
        },
        {
            "Sid": "ManagedRuleForSyncInvoke",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "events:PutRule",
                "events:PutTargets",
                "events:DescribeRule"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:events:us-east-1:000000000000:rule/StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule"
        }
    ]
}
== notifier role inline ==
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Sid": "Logs",
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "logs:CreateLogGroup",
                "logs:CreateLogStream",
                "logs:PutLogEvents"
            ],
            "Resource": "arn:aws:logs:us-east-1:000000000000:log-group:/aws/lambda/notification-lambda:*"
        }
    ]
}
  • Create KMS key + alias
  • Create secret app/db/password
  • Create EventBridge bus rotation-events
  • Create rotator lambda + role
  • Create notification lambda + role
  • Create EventBridge rule routing to notifier
  • Create child SM + role
  • Create parent SM + role
  • End-to-end verification
Built and verified. End-to-end test: one `start-execution` on `rotation-orchestrator` with no input finished `SUCCEEDED` in ~1s; `AWSCURRENT` moved to a new version with a fresh password, the old version is now `AWSPREVIOUS`, and the notification lambda logged `notified: rotation complete secret=app/db/password version=…`. A second rotation produced a different password. Pieces: - **KMS**: customer-managed CMK aliased `alias/app-rotation-key`, key policy allows Secrets Manager service + the rotator role only. - **Secret** `app/db/password` encrypted with that CMK. - **Rotator lambda** `secrets-rotator` (python3.11) generates a 32-char password and calls `PutSecretValue` , Secrets Manager handles the `AWSCURRENT` → `AWSPREVIOUS` label shift. - **Notification lambda** `notification-lambda` (python3.11) prints the `notified:` line. - **EventBridge bus** `rotation-events` + rule `on-rotation-success` matching `{source: rotation.pipeline, detail-type: RotationComplete}` with the notifier as target (plus a lambda `InvokeFunction` resource policy scoped to that rule's ARN). - **Child SM** `rotation-child`: `Rotate` (lambda:invoke) → `Notify` (events:putEvents on the custom bus). - **Parent SM** `rotation-orchestrator`: single `states:startExecution.sync:2` task to the child. Least-privilege policies (no wildcards on Action/Resource except where a single action applies to a single ARN pattern): - `secrets-rotator-role`: logs scoped to its own log group, secretsmanager actions scoped to `secret:app/db/password-*`, KMS actions scoped to the CMK's key ARN. - `rotation-child-role`: `lambda:InvokeFunction` on the rotator ARN, `events:PutEvents` on the `rotation-events` bus ARN. - `rotation-orchestrator-role`: `states:StartExecution` on child SM ARN; `states:DescribeExecution` + `states:StopExecution` on `execution:rotation-child:*`; `events:PutRule`/`PutTargets`/`DescribeRule` scoped to the managed `StepFunctionsGetEventsForStepFunctionsExecutionRule` rule ARN (required by `sync:2`). - `notification-lambda-role`: logs only, scoped to its own log group. All artifacts live in `/app/build/` (definitions, policies, zips, and saved ARNs in dotfiles) if the verifier wants to re-read them.
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/8KvybffdT6PTU98U8NA-I/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 15 items

../tests/test_state.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real PASSED               [  6%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_localstack_reachable PASSED                 [ 13%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk PASSED  [ 20%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists PASSED               [ 26%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_exists PASSED           [ 33%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_and_child_state_machines_exist PASSED [ 40%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_event_bus_and_rule_exist PASSED             [ 46%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rule_target_points_at_notification_lambda PASSED [ 53%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_role_grants_kms_actions PASSED      [ 60%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_rotator_role PASSED   [ 66%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke FAILED [ 73%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms FAILED [ 80%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish FAILED    [ 86%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_allows_eventbridge_invoke PASSED [ 93%]
../tests/test_state.py::test_end_to_end_parent_execution_rotates_and_notifies PASSED [100%]

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
_______________ test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke _______________

lmb = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffffa9793020>

    def test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke(lmb):
        try:
            policy_doc = json.loads(
>               lmb.get_policy(FunctionName=ROTATOR_FUNCTION)["Policy"]
                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
            )

/tests/test_state.py:332: 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
/root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/8KvybffdT6PTU98U8NA-I/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/client.py:569: in _api_call
    return self._make_api_call(operation_name, kwargs)
           ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

self = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffffa9793020>
operation_name = 'GetPolicy', api_params = {'FunctionName': 'secrets-rotator'}

    def _make_api_call(self, operation_name, api_params):
        operation_model = self._service_model.operation_model(operation_name)
        service_name = self._service_model.service_name
        history_recorder.record(
            'API_CALL',
            {
                'service': service_name,
                'operation': operation_name,
                'params': api_params,
            },
        )
        if operation_model.deprecated:
            logger.debug(
                'Warning: %s.%s() is deprecated', service_name, operation_name
            )
        request_context = {
            'client_region': self.meta.region_name,
            'client_config': self.meta.config,
            'has_streaming_input': operation_model.has_streaming_input,
            'auth_type': operation_model.resolved_auth_type,
            'unsigned_payload': operation_model.unsigned_payload,
        }
    
        api_params = self._emit_api_params(
            api_params=api_params,
            operation_model=operation_model,
            context=request_context,
        )
        (
            endpoint_url,
            additional_headers,
            properties,
        ) = self._resolve_endpoint_ruleset(
            operation_model, api_params, request_context
        )
        if properties:
            # Pass arbitrary endpoint info with the Request
            # for use during construction.
            request_context['endpoint_properties'] = properties
        request_dict = self._convert_to_request_dict(
            api_params=api_params,
            operation_model=operation_model,
            endpoint_url=endpoint_url,
            context=request_context,
            headers=additional_headers,
        )
        resolve_checksum_context(request_dict, operation_model, api_params)
    
        service_id = self._service_model.service_id.hyphenize()
        handler, event_response = self.meta.events.emit_until_response(
            f'before-call.{service_id}.{operation_name}',
            model=operation_model,
            params=request_dict,
            request_signer=self._request_signer,
            context=request_context,
        )
    
        if event_response is not None:
            http, parsed_response = event_response
        else:
            maybe_compress_request(
                self.meta.config, request_dict, operation_model
            )
            apply_request_checksum(request_dict)
            http, parsed_response = self._make_request(
                operation_model, request_dict, request_context
            )
    
        self.meta.events.emit(
            f'after-call.{service_id}.{operation_name}',
            http_response=http,
            parsed=parsed_response,
            model=operation_model,
            context=request_context,
        )
    
        if http.status_code >= 300:
            error_info = parsed_response.get("Error", {})
            error_code = error_info.get("QueryErrorCode") or error_info.get(
                "Code"
            )
            error_class = self.exceptions.from_code(error_code)
>           raise error_class(parsed_response, operation_name)
E           botocore.errorfactory.ResourceNotFoundException: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

/root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/8KvybffdT6PTU98U8NA-I/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/client.py:1023: ResourceNotFoundException

During handling of the above exception, another exception occurred:

lmb = <botocore.client.Lambda object at 0xffffa9793020>

    def test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke(lmb):
        try:
            policy_doc = json.loads(
                lmb.get_policy(FunctionName=ROTATOR_FUNCTION)["Policy"]
            )
        except ClientError as e:
>           pytest.fail(
                f"Lambda {ROTATOR_FUNCTION} has no resource-based policy , "
                f"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com cannot invoke it: {e}"
            )
E           Failed: Lambda secrets-rotator has no resource-based policy , secretsmanager.amazonaws.com cannot invoke it: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

/tests/test_state.py:335: Failed
_______________ test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms _______________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffffa92cda00>

    def test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms(iam):
        """The .sync:2 integration registers an EventBridge-managed callback
        rule. Parent role needs events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule plus
        full states:* on the child."""
        found_events = False
        found_states = False
        for _pname, st in _inline_statements(iam, PARENT_ROLE):
            actions = set(_normalise_list(st.get("Action")))
            if _actions_cover(actions, REQUIRED_PARENT_EVENTS_ACTIONS):
                found_events = True
            if _actions_cover(actions, REQUIRED_PARENT_STATES_ACTIONS):
                found_states = True
        assert found_events, (
            f"{PARENT_ROLE} missing events:PutRule/PutTargets/DescribeRule. "
            f".sync:2 uses an EventBridge-managed callback rule; without "
            f"these the parent cannot set up the callback."
        )
>       assert found_states, (
            f"{PARENT_ROLE} missing states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/"
            f"StopExecution. .sync:2 requires all three on the child SM."
        )
E       AssertionError: rotation-orchestrator-role missing states:StartExecution/DescribeExecution/StopExecution. .sync:2 requires all three on the child SM.
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:377: AssertionError
____________________ test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish ____________________

iam = <botocore.client.IAM object at 0xffffa92cda00>

    def test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish(iam):
        found_rotate = False
        found_putevents = False
        for _pname, st in _inline_statements(iam, CHILD_ROLE):
            actions = set(_normalise_list(st.get("Action")))
            if _actions_cover(actions, {"secretsmanager:RotateSecret"}):
                found_rotate = True
            if _actions_cover(actions, {"events:PutEvents"}):
                found_putevents = True
>       assert found_rotate, (
            f"{CHILD_ROLE} lacks secretsmanager:RotateSecret , the child "
            f"state machine cannot trigger rotation."
        )
E       AssertionError: rotation-child-role lacks secretsmanager:RotateSecret , the child state machine cannot trigger rotation.
E       assert False

/tests/test_state.py:392: AssertionError
=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_state.py: 33 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/8KvybffdT6PTU98U8NA-I/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_localstack_reachable
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_exists
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_and_child_state_machines_exist
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_event_bus_and_rule_exist
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_rule_target_points_at_notification_lambda
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_role_grants_kms_actions
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_rotator_role
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_notification_lambda_allows_eventbridge_invoke
PASSED ../tests/test_state.py::test_end_to_end_parent_execution_rotates_and_notifies
FAILED ../tests/test_state.py::test_rotator_lambda_allows_secretsmanager_invoke
FAILED ../tests/test_state.py::test_parent_role_grants_sync2_managed_rule_perms
FAILED ../tests/test_state.py::test_child_role_can_rotate_and_publish - Asser...
================== 3 failed, 12 passed, 33 warnings in 7.21s ===================

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_90921d8ab99e49c6. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_90921d8ab99e49c6 · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.