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secrets-rotation-kms

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✓ resolved GOOD_SUCCESS ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
GOOD_SUCCESSLegitimate solve, implements the asked-for behavior; tests verify real functionality.
SubtypeLegitimate Solution
EvidenceAll 8 tests passed: test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions, test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role, test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke, and test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent. The verifier explicitly checks policy documents for least privilege. Agent systematically fixed all four broken layers: (1) handler's finish_secret implementation, (2) Lambda resource-based policy, (3) IAM role KMS actions, (4) KMS key policy. Result: reward=1.0, verified pass on e2e rotation with AWSCURRENT advancement.
Root causeAgent correctly diagnosed and fixed a complex four-layer AWS Secrets Manager rotation issue where the Lambda handler, Lambda resource policy, IAM role policy, and KMS key policy all had deliberate gaps that prevented rotation from advancing AWSCURRENT. The fix demonstrated proper understanding of AWS credential scoping, least-privilege IAM, KMS grants, and Lambda execution flow.
RecommendationN/A - task is fine
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
10 tool calls · 3 tool types · 16 steps
# Make AWS Secrets Manager rotation actually rotate You are working against a LocalStack AWS endpoint at `http://localstack:4566`. The container already has `aws` (AWS CLI v2), `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`, `zip`, and `curl` installed. `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test`, and `AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1` are already exported. The environment has been pre-seeded by `/app/setup.sh` with a **partially-deployed, broken-by-design** Secrets Manager rotation setup. You must diagnose what's wrong and make rotation actually advance the secret to a new value. ## Starter resources Every resource below already exists , do not rename or recreate unless you know what you're doing: - **Secret**: `app/db/password`, encrypted with a customer-managed CMK - **KMS CMK**: alias `alias/app-rotation-key` (symmetric ENCRYPT_DECRYPT) - **Rotation Lambda**: function `secrets-rotator`, runtime `python3.11`, source on disk at `/app/handler.py` - **IAM role**: `secrets-rotator-role` (inline policy `SecretsRotatorPolicy`) with the Lambda's execution permissions - **Rotation config** is already attached to the secret (pointing at the rotation Lambda), but invoking it fails , the layers needed to actually carry out the rotation are broken. ## Required outcome After your fix, running ```bash aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password ``` must: 1. **Succeed without error.** 2. **Advance `AWSCURRENT`** to a fresh version ID , the version that holds the `AWSCURRENT` label after rotation must be different from the version that held it before, and the string value returned by `get-secret-value` must change. 3. **Label the prior version as `AWSPREVIOUS`.** The verifier inspects both the end-to-end behaviour and the shape of the underlying IAM / KMS / Lambda configuration. Least privilege matters , the grader reads policy documents directly. The rotation Lambda source lives at `/app/handler.py`; redeploy with `aws lambda update-function-code --zip-file fileb://...`. LocalStack spawns Lambda containers on the shared compose network, so `http://localstack:4566` is reachable from inside the function.

List /app contents and read setup script

shell
ls /app/ && cat /app/setup.sh 2>/dev/null | head -200
output
handler.py
setup.sh
starter
#!/bin/bash
# Seeds LocalStack with the broken-by-design state the agent inherits:
#   - customer-managed KMS CMK (alias alias/app-rotation-key)
#   - Secrets Manager secret encrypted with that CMK
#   - IAM role for the rotation Lambda (with deliberately incomplete policy)
#   - Rotation Lambda (with a subtle bug in finishSecret)
#   - Rotation configured on the secret, pointing at the Lambda
#
# The task expects these resources to already exist when the agent starts
# working. The agent must find the bugs and make `rotate-secret` actually
# advance AWSCURRENT end-to-end.

set -euo pipefail

REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"
SECRET_NAME="app/db/password"
ROLE_NAME="secrets-rotator-role"
FUNCTION="secrets-rotator"
KEY_ALIAS="alias/app-rotation-key"

log() { echo "[setup] $*" >&2; }

log "waiting for localstack health..."
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  if curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | grep -q '"secretsmanager": "available"'; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 2
done

# 1. CMK with a minimal key policy (root admin only , no grant for the
#    rotation Lambda role yet).
log "creating KMS CMK"
KEY_POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key \
  --description "Customer CMK for app/db/password" \
  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
  --policy "$KEY_POLICY" \
  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
aws kms create-alias --alias-name "$KEY_ALIAS" --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" >/dev/null
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"
log "created CMK $KEY_ID"

# 2. Secret, encrypted with the CMK.
log "creating secret"
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --kms-key-id "$KEY_ARN" \
  --secret-string '{"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}' \
  --description "App DB password, rotated by Lambda" >/dev/null

SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)
log "created secret $SECRET_ARN"

# 3. IAM role for the rotation Lambda. Deliberately incomplete , has
#    secretsmanager:* but no KMS actions. The broken state the agent
#    inherits.
log "creating rotation Lambda role"
TRUST=$(cat <<'JSON'
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"}, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"}
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --assume-role-policy-document "$TRUST" >/dev/null

aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole

INLINE=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document "$INLINE"

ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
log "created role $ROLE_ARN"

# 4. Package + deploy the rotation Lambda (with its buggy handler).
log "packaging rotation Lambda"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cp /app/handler.py "${WORKDIR}/handler.py"
(cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py)

aws lambda create-function \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role "$ROLE_ARN" \
  --handler handler.lambda_handler \
  --timeout 30 \
  --memory-size 256 \
  --environment "Variables={SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566}" \
  --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
    --query 'Configuration.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo "Pending")
  [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
log "Lambda $FUNCTION active"

# NOTE: deliberately NOT calling `aws lambda add-permission` with
# principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com. The agent must add that.

# 5. Attach rotation config on the secret. Secrets Manager refuses to
#    attach unless the rotation Lambda already grants it InvokeFunction,
#    so we temporarily add that permission, attach rotation, then remove
#    the permission so the agent still has to re-add it as part of their
#    fix. Net result: RotationEnabled=true but rotation fails at runtime
#    because of the other broken layers (KMS grants, handler bug, Lambda
#    resource policy).
log "attaching rotation config (temp Lambda permission)"
FUNCTION_ARN="arn:aws:lambda:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:function:${FUNCTION}"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

if aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
     --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
     --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
     --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 \
     --no-rotate-immediately >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (no immediate trigger)"
elif aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
       --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
       --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
       --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (first run may have fired)"
else
  log "rotate-secret failed even with temp permission , check LocalStack compat"
fi

# Strip the temp permission so the agent still has to add it.
aws lambda remove-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

log "done"

[stdout]
handler.py
setup.sh
starter
#!/bin/bash
# Seeds LocalStack with the broken-by-design state the agent inherits:
#   - customer-managed KMS CMK (alias alias/app-rotation-key)
#   - Secrets Manager secret encrypted with that CMK
#   - IAM role for the rotation Lambda (with deliberately incomplete policy)
#   - Rotation Lambda (with a subtle bug in finishSecret)
#   - Rotation configured on the secret, pointing at the Lambda
#
# The task expects these resources to already exist when the agent starts
# working. The agent must find the bugs and make `rotate-secret` actually
# advance AWSCURRENT end-to-end.

set -euo pipefail

REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"
SECRET_NAME="app/db/password"
ROLE_NAME="secrets-rotator-role"
FUNCTION="secrets-rotator"
KEY_ALIAS="alias/app-rotation-key"

log() { echo "[setup] $*" >&2; }

log "waiting for localstack health..."
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  if curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | grep -q '"secretsmanager": "available"'; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 2
done

# 1. CMK with a minimal key policy (root admin only , no grant for the
#    rotation Lambda role yet).
log "creating KMS CMK"
KEY_POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key \
  --description "Customer CMK for app/db/password" \
  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
  --policy "$KEY_POLICY" \
  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
aws kms create-alias --alias-name "$KEY_ALIAS" --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" >/dev/null
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"
log "created CMK $KEY_ID"

# 2. Secret, encrypted with the CMK.
log "creating secret"
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --kms-key-id "$KEY_ARN" \
  --secret-string '{"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}' \
  --description "App DB password, rotated by Lambda" >/dev/null

SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)
log "created secret $SECRET_ARN"

# 3. IAM role for the rotation Lambda. Deliberately incomplete , has
#    secretsmanager:* but no KMS actions. The broken state the agent
#    inherits.
log "creating rotation Lambda role"
TRUST=$(cat <<'JSON'
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"}, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"}
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --assume-role-policy-document "$TRUST" >/dev/null

aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole

INLINE=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document "$INLINE"

ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
log "created role $ROLE_ARN"

# 4. Package + deploy the rotation Lambda (with its buggy handler).
log "packaging rotation Lambda"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cp /app/handler.py "${WORKDIR}/handler.py"
(cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py)

aws lambda create-function \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role "$ROLE_ARN" \
  --handler handler.lambda_handler \
  --timeout 30 \
  --memory-size 256 \
  --environment "Variables={SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566}" \
  --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
    --query 'Configuration.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo "Pending")
  [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
log "Lambda $FUNCTION active"

# NOTE: deliberately NOT calling `aws lambda add-permission` with
# principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com. The agent must add that.

# 5. Attach rotation config on the secret. Secrets Manager refuses to
#    attach unless the rotation Lambda already grants it InvokeFunction,
#    so we temporarily add that permission, attach rotation, then remove
#    the permission so the agent still has to re-add it as part of their
#    fix. Net result: RotationEnabled=true but rotation fails at runtime
#    because of the other broken layers (KMS grants, handler bug, Lambda
#    resource policy).
log "attaching rotation config (temp Lambda permission)"
FUNCTION_ARN="arn:aws:lambda:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:function:${FUNCTION}"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

if aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
     --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
     --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
     --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 \
     --no-rotate-immediately >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (no immediate trigger)"
elif aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
       --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
       --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
       --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (first run may have fired)"
else
  log "rotate-secret failed even with temp permission , check LocalStack compat"
fi

# Strip the temp permission so the agent still has to add it.
aws lambda remove-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

log "done"

/app/handler.py

contents
1	# Rotation Lambda for AWS Secrets Manager, "single-user" pattern
2	# (no external database, value is self-contained).
3	#
4	# Secrets Manager calls this function 4 times in sequence per rotation,
5	# passing a Step field: createSecret, setSecret, testSecret, finishSecret.
6	# Each step must return cleanly for the rotation to advance.
7	#
8	# Reference:
9	#   https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/rotate-secrets_lambda-functions.html
10	
11	import json
12	import logging
13	import os
14	
15	import boto3
16	
17	logger = logging.getLogger()
18	logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
19	
20	ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT") or os.environ.get(
21	    "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL"
22	)
23	
24	
25	def _client():
26	    return boto3.client("secretsmanager", endpoint_url=ENDPOINT) if ENDPOINT else boto3.client("secretsmanager")
27	
28	
29	def lambda_handler(event, context):
30	    arn = event["SecretId"]
31	    token = event["ClientRequestToken"]
32	    step = event["Step"]
33	
34	    client = _client()
35	
36	    desc = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
37	    if not desc.get("RotationEnabled"):
38	        logger.error("Secret %s is not enabled for rotation", arn)
39	        raise ValueError(f"Secret {arn} is not enabled for rotation")
40	
41	    versions = desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {})
42	    if token not in versions:
43	        logger.error("Secret version %s has no stage for rotation of %s", token, arn)
44	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} has no stage for rotation of secret {arn}")
45	    if "AWSCURRENT" in versions[token]:
46	        logger.info("Secret version %s already AWSCURRENT for %s", token, arn)
47	        return
48	    if "AWSPENDING" not in versions[token]:
49	        logger.error("Secret version %s not staged as AWSPENDING for %s", token, arn)
50	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} not set as AWSPENDING for rotation of secret {arn}")
51	
52	    if step == "createSecret":
53	        create_secret(client, arn, token)
54	    elif step == "setSecret":
55	        set_secret(client, arn, token)
56	    elif step == "testSecret":
57	        test_secret(client, arn, token)
58	    elif step == "finishSecret":
59	        finish_secret(client, arn, token)
60	    else:
61	        raise ValueError(f"Invalid step parameter: {step}")
62	
63	
64	def create_secret(client, arn, token):
65	    # Generate a new candidate value and stash it as AWSPENDING.
66	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
67	
68	    try:
69	        client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
70	        logger.info("createSecret: pending version %s already exists", token)
71	    except client.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
72	        password = client.get_random_password(PasswordLength=32, ExcludePunctuation=True)
73	        client.put_secret_value(
74	            SecretId=arn,
75	            ClientRequestToken=token,
76	            SecretString=json.dumps({"password": password["RandomPassword"]}),
77	            VersionStages=["AWSPENDING"],
78	        )
79	        logger.info("createSecret: stored new AWSPENDING version %s", token)
80	
81	
82	def set_secret(client, arn, token):
83	    # No external system to update for a self-contained secret; validate
84	    # that both AWSCURRENT and AWSPENDING are readable and move on.
85	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
86	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
87	    logger.info("setSecret: both stages readable")
88	
89	
90	def test_secret(client, arn, token):
91	    # Sanity-check the pending value parses as JSON with a non-empty
92	    # password field. Real handlers would attempt a login here.
93	    pending = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
94	    parsed = json.loads(pending["SecretString"])
95	    if not parsed.get("password"):
96	        raise ValueError("testSecret: pending value has no password")
97	    logger.info("testSecret: pending value validated")
98	
99	
100	def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
101	    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
102	    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
103	    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
104	    # consumers keep reading the old password.
105	    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
106

Inspect starter dir and describe secret

shell
ls /app/starter/ 2>/dev/null; aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password 2>&1 | head -40
output
handler-broken.py
setup.sh
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/4e4cbb20-51ad-4d62-b21f-42ccbe0dd1f1",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:13+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:09.883000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:28:08+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:00.613579+00:00"
}

[stdout]
handler-broken.py
setup.sh
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/4e4cbb20-51ad-4d62-b21f-42ccbe0dd1f1",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:13+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:09.883000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:28:08+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:28:00.613579+00:00"
}

Inspect current IAM role policy, Lambda policy, and KMS policy

shell
aws iam get-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy 2>&1; echo "---"; aws lambda get-policy --function-name secrets-rotator 2>&1; echo "---"; aws kms get-key-policy --key-id alias/app-rotation-key --policy-name default 2>&1
output
{
    "RoleName": "secrets-rotator-role",
    "PolicyName": "SecretsRotatorPolicy",
    "PolicyDocument": {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                    "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
                "Resource": "*"
            }
        ]
    }
}
---

aws: [ERROR]: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

Additional error details:
Type: User
---
{
    "Policy": "{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Id\": \"app-rotation-key-policy\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"EnableRootAdmin\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\",\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    }\n  ]\n}"
}

[stdout]
{
    "RoleName": "secrets-rotator-role",
    "PolicyName": "SecretsRotatorPolicy",
    "PolicyDocument": {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                    "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
                "Resource": "*"
            }
        ]
    }
}
---

aws: [ERROR]: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

Additional error details:
Type: User
---
{
    "Policy": "{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Id\": \"app-rotation-key-policy\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"EnableRootAdmin\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\",\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    }\n  ]\n}"
}
Now I have the full picture. Four layers are broken: 1. **Handler**: `finish_secret` is a no-op , doesn't promote AWSPENDING→AWSCURRENT 2. **Lambda resource policy**: missing (Secrets Manager can't invoke) 3. **IAM role policy**: no KMS actions 4. **KMS key policy**: root-only, no entry for the Lambda role Let me fix the handler first.

/app/handler.py

− removed
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
    # consumers keep reading the old password.
    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
+ added
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    desc = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
    current_version = None
    for version_id, stages in desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {}).items():
        if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
            if version_id == token:
                logger.info("finishSecret: %s is already AWSCURRENT", token)
                return
            current_version = version_id
            break

    client.update_secret_version_stage(
        SecretId=arn,
        VersionStage="AWSCURRENT",
        MoveToVersionId=token,
        RemoveFromVersionId=current_version,
    )
    logger.info("finishSecret: promoted %s to AWSCURRENT", token)
Now redeploy the Lambda, add the Secrets Manager invoke permission, fix IAM policy, and update the KMS key policy.

Package and redeploy the Lambda

shell
set -e
cd /tmp && cp /app/handler.py . && zip -q handler.zip handler.py
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name secrets-rotator --zip-file fileb:///tmp/handler.zip --query 'LastModified' --output text
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name secrets-rotator --query 'Configuration.LastUpdateStatus' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo Pending)
  [ "$STATE" = "Successful" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
echo "Lambda update: $STATE"
output
2026-04-22T19:30:12.539025+0000
Lambda update: Successful
Shell cwd was reset to /app

[stdout]
2026-04-22T19:30:12.539025+0000
Lambda update: Successful
[stderr]

Shell cwd was reset to /app

Grant Secrets Manager permission to invoke the rotation Lambda

shell
SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'ARN' --output text)
echo "SECRET_ARN=$SECRET_ARN"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name secrets-rotator \
  --statement-id SecretsManagerInvoke \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" 2>&1
output
SECRET_ARN=arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH\"}}}"
}

[stdout]
SECRET_ARN=arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH\"}}}"
}
Now the IAM role's KMS permissions and the KMS key policy. Scoping tightly: the rotation Lambda only needs `Decrypt` and `GenerateDataKey` on the CMK, further constrained by `kms:ViaService` to Secrets Manager and `kms:EncryptionContext:SecretARN` to our secret.

Update IAM inline policy and KMS key policy with least-privilege KMS access

shell
KEY_ARN=$(aws kms describe-key --key-id alias/app-rotation-key --query 'KeyMetadata.Arn' --output text)
SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'ARN' --output text)
ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name secrets-rotator-role --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
echo "KEY_ARN=$KEY_ARN"
echo "ROLE_ARN=$ROLE_ARN"
cat > /tmp/inline.json <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "SecretsOps",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "RandomPassword",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "KmsForSecret",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "kms:ViaService": "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
          "kms:EncryptionContext:SecretARN": "${SECRET_ARN}"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
JSON

aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name secrets-rotator-role \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document file:///tmp/inline.json

cat > /tmp/keypolicy.json <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "AllowRotationLambdaUseViaSecretsManager",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "${ROLE_ARN}" },
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey",
        "kms:DescribeKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "kms:ViaService": "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
          "kms:EncryptionContext:SecretARN": "${SECRET_ARN}"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
JSON

aws kms put-key-policy \
  --key-id alias/app-rotation-key \
  --policy-name default \
  --policy file:///tmp/keypolicy.json
echo "policies updated"
output
KEY_ARN=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/4e4cbb20-51ad-4d62-b21f-42ccbe0dd1f1
ROLE_ARN=arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role
policies updated

[stdout]
KEY_ARN=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/4e4cbb20-51ad-4d62-b21f-42ccbe0dd1f1
ROLE_ARN=arn:aws:iam::000000000000:role/secrets-rotator-role
policies updated

Run rotate-secret and verify AWSCURRENT advances

shell
BEFORE_VER=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages' --output json)
BEFORE_CUR_ID=$(echo "$BEFORE_VER" | python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(next(k for k,v in d.items() if "AWSCURRENT" in v))')
BEFORE_CUR_VAL=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "before_versions=$BEFORE_VER"
echo "before_current_id=$BEFORE_CUR_ID"
echo "before_current_val=$BEFORE_CUR_VAL"

echo "--- rotate-secret ---"
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password
echo "--- waiting for lambda to finish ---"
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
  AFTER_CUR_ID=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages' --output json | python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(next((k for k,v in d.items() if "AWSCURRENT" in v), ""))')
  if [ -n "$AFTER_CUR_ID" ] && [ "$AFTER_CUR_ID" != "$BEFORE_CUR_ID" ]; then break; fi
  sleep 1
done

echo "--- after ---"
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query '{VersionIdsToStages:VersionIdsToStages,LastRotatedDate:LastRotatedDate}'
AFTER_CUR_VAL=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "after_current_val=$AFTER_CUR_VAL"
echo "after_current_id=$AFTER_CUR_ID"
[ "$AFTER_CUR_ID" != "$BEFORE_CUR_ID" ] && echo "VERSION ADVANCED" || echo "VERSION UNCHANGED"
[ "$AFTER_CUR_VAL" != "$BEFORE_CUR_VAL" ] && echo "VALUE CHANGED" || echo "VALUE UNCHANGED"
output
before_versions={
    "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
        "AWSPENDING"
    ]
}
before_current_id=b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71
before_current_val={"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}
--- rotate-secret ---
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c"
}
--- waiting for lambda to finish ---
--- after ---
{
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
            "AWSPREVIOUS"
        ],
        "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
            "AWSPENDING",
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ]
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:30:52+00:00"
}
after_current_val={"password": "uNSkbSYSChzY2EYNe9dSbvIR2VLPhbD8"}
after_current_id=114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c
VERSION ADVANCED
VALUE CHANGED

[stdout]
before_versions={
    "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
        "AWSPENDING"
    ]
}
before_current_id=b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71
before_current_val={"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}
--- rotate-secret ---
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c"
}
--- waiting for lambda to finish ---
--- after ---
{
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "b916b193-7a50-4d10-8562-3396b4dd2b71": [
            "AWSPREVIOUS"
        ],
        "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
            "AWSPENDING",
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ]
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:30:52+00:00"
}
after_current_val={"password": "uNSkbSYSChzY2EYNe9dSbvIR2VLPhbD8"}
after_current_id=114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c
VERSION ADVANCED
VALUE CHANGED
Rotation works. Let me verify another rotation round to confirm idempotency.

Run a second rotation to confirm steady-state rotation works

shell
BEFORE_CUR_ID=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages' --output json | python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(next(k for k,v in d.items() if "AWSCURRENT" in v))')
BEFORE_VAL=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "before: id=$BEFORE_CUR_ID val=$BEFORE_VAL"
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password
for i in $(seq 1 30); do
  CUR_ID=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages' --output json | python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(next((k for k,v in d.items() if "AWSCURRENT" in v), ""))')
  [ -n "$CUR_ID" ] && [ "$CUR_ID" != "$BEFORE_CUR_ID" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages'
AFTER_VAL=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "after:  id=$CUR_ID val=$AFTER_VAL"
output
before: id=114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c val={"password": "uNSkbSYSChzY2EYNe9dSbvIR2VLPhbD8"}
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055"
}
{
    "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055": [
        "AWSPENDING",
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
after:  id=0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055 val={"password": "z03HP6eTYSGyBSA3bCQndTBRhveo0qF9"}

[stdout]
before: id=114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c val={"password": "uNSkbSYSChzY2EYNe9dSbvIR2VLPhbD8"}
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-QFQlPH",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055"
}
{
    "114e2e16-c486-4f38-b1b1-7e707701030c": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055": [
        "AWSPENDING",
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
after:  id=0cffacf3-c77e-4bc2-ad82-0ca70ac0c055 val={"password": "z03HP6eTYSGyBSA3bCQndTBRhveo0qF9"}
Rotation is fully working end-to-end, including repeat rotations. ## Summary of fixes **`/app/handler.py`** , implemented `finish_secret`: locate the old AWSCURRENT version, then `update_secret_version_stage` to move AWSCURRENT from old→token (which also assigns AWSPREVIOUS to the old version). Redeployed via `lambda update-function-code`. **Lambda resource policy** , added a statement allowing `secretsmanager.amazonaws.com` to `lambda:InvokeFunction`, scoped to the secret's ARN via `AWS:SourceArn`. **IAM role `SecretsRotatorPolicy`** , added `kms:Decrypt` and `kms:GenerateDataKey` on the specific CMK ARN, gated by `kms:ViaService=secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` and `kms:EncryptionContext:SecretARN=<this secret>`. **KMS key policy** , added a second statement granting the rotation role `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:GenerateDataKey`, `kms:DescribeKey`, gated by the same `kms:ViaService` + `EncryptionContext:SecretARN` conditions. Root admin statement retained. Verified: `rotate-secret` succeeds, AWSCURRENT advances to a new version ID, the secret string changes, and the prior version is labeled AWSPREVIOUS.
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/G4QQpdL0MTRGnt2blvEs5/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 8 items

../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real PASSED             [ 12%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable PASSED               [ 25%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk PASSED [ 37%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists PASSED             [ 50%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions PASSED     [ 62%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role PASSED  [ 75%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke PASSED [ 87%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent PASSED  [100%]

=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_outputs.py: 14 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/G4QQpdL0MTRGnt2blvEs5/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent
======================== 8 passed, 14 warnings in 4.94s ========================

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_9d3ea69051b84345. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_9d3ea69051b84345 · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.