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secrets-rotation-kms

claude-code claude-opus-4-7 ✓ resolved HARNESS_ERROR ↑ View task
Solved from the instruction alone, tests/ and solution/ were withheld from the agent's workspace and restored only for grading.
Reward = tests/test.sh exit code (0 → resolved); the classification below is post-hoc and cannot change it.
Classification , post-hoc; cannot change the reward
HARNESS_ERRORInfrastructure failure, the agent never ran properly. Not a signal about agent or task.
SubtypeClassification Failed
EvidenceClaude Code classification failed: (classifier unavailable for this trial)
Root causeCould not analyze trial with Claude Code
RecommendationReview trial manually or check authentication
Trajectory
Tool-by-tool agent trajectory
12 tool calls · 3 tool types · 17 steps
# Make AWS Secrets Manager rotation actually rotate You are working against a LocalStack AWS endpoint at `http://localstack:4566`. The container already has `aws` (AWS CLI v2), `python3`, `boto3`, `jq`, `zip`, and `curl` installed. `AWS_ENDPOINT_URL`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test`, `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test`, and `AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1` are already exported. The environment has been pre-seeded by `/app/setup.sh` with a **partially-deployed, broken-by-design** Secrets Manager rotation setup. You must diagnose what's wrong and make rotation actually advance the secret to a new value. ## Starter resources Every resource below already exists , do not rename or recreate unless you know what you're doing: - **Secret**: `app/db/password`, encrypted with a customer-managed CMK - **KMS CMK**: alias `alias/app-rotation-key` (symmetric ENCRYPT_DECRYPT) - **Rotation Lambda**: function `secrets-rotator`, runtime `python3.11`, source on disk at `/app/handler.py` - **IAM role**: `secrets-rotator-role` (inline policy `SecretsRotatorPolicy`) with the Lambda's execution permissions - **Rotation config** is already attached to the secret (pointing at the rotation Lambda), but invoking it fails , the layers needed to actually carry out the rotation are broken. ## Required outcome After your fix, running ```bash aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password ``` must: 1. **Succeed without error.** 2. **Advance `AWSCURRENT`** to a fresh version ID , the version that holds the `AWSCURRENT` label after rotation must be different from the version that held it before, and the string value returned by `get-secret-value` must change. 3. **Label the prior version as `AWSPREVIOUS`.** The verifier inspects both the end-to-end behaviour and the shape of the underlying IAM / KMS / Lambda configuration. Least privilege matters , the grader reads policy documents directly. The rotation Lambda source lives at `/app/handler.py`; redeploy with `aws lambda update-function-code --zip-file fileb://...`. LocalStack spawns Lambda containers on the shared compose network, so `http://localstack:4566` is reachable from inside the function.

List /app contents and view setup.sh

shell
ls /app/ && cat /app/setup.sh 2>/dev/null | head -200
output
handler.py
setup.sh
starter
#!/bin/bash
# Seeds LocalStack with the broken-by-design state the agent inherits:
#   - customer-managed KMS CMK (alias alias/app-rotation-key)
#   - Secrets Manager secret encrypted with that CMK
#   - IAM role for the rotation Lambda (with deliberately incomplete policy)
#   - Rotation Lambda (with a subtle bug in finishSecret)
#   - Rotation configured on the secret, pointing at the Lambda
#
# The task expects these resources to already exist when the agent starts
# working. The agent must find the bugs and make `rotate-secret` actually
# advance AWSCURRENT end-to-end.

set -euo pipefail

REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"
SECRET_NAME="app/db/password"
ROLE_NAME="secrets-rotator-role"
FUNCTION="secrets-rotator"
KEY_ALIAS="alias/app-rotation-key"

log() { echo "[setup] $*" >&2; }

log "waiting for localstack health..."
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  if curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | grep -q '"secretsmanager": "available"'; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 2
done

# 1. CMK with a minimal key policy (root admin only , no grant for the
#    rotation Lambda role yet).
log "creating KMS CMK"
KEY_POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key \
  --description "Customer CMK for app/db/password" \
  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
  --policy "$KEY_POLICY" \
  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
aws kms create-alias --alias-name "$KEY_ALIAS" --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" >/dev/null
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"
log "created CMK $KEY_ID"

# 2. Secret, encrypted with the CMK.
log "creating secret"
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --kms-key-id "$KEY_ARN" \
  --secret-string '{"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}' \
  --description "App DB password, rotated by Lambda" >/dev/null

SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)
log "created secret $SECRET_ARN"

# 3. IAM role for the rotation Lambda. Deliberately incomplete , has
#    secretsmanager:* but no KMS actions. The broken state the agent
#    inherits.
log "creating rotation Lambda role"
TRUST=$(cat <<'JSON'
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"}, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"}
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --assume-role-policy-document "$TRUST" >/dev/null

aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole

INLINE=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document "$INLINE"

ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
log "created role $ROLE_ARN"

# 4. Package + deploy the rotation Lambda (with its buggy handler).
log "packaging rotation Lambda"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cp /app/handler.py "${WORKDIR}/handler.py"
(cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py)

aws lambda create-function \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role "$ROLE_ARN" \
  --handler handler.lambda_handler \
  --timeout 30 \
  --memory-size 256 \
  --environment "Variables={SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566}" \
  --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
    --query 'Configuration.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo "Pending")
  [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
log "Lambda $FUNCTION active"

# NOTE: deliberately NOT calling `aws lambda add-permission` with
# principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com. The agent must add that.

# 5. Attach rotation config on the secret. Secrets Manager refuses to
#    attach unless the rotation Lambda already grants it InvokeFunction,
#    so we temporarily add that permission, attach rotation, then remove
#    the permission so the agent still has to re-add it as part of their
#    fix. Net result: RotationEnabled=true but rotation fails at runtime
#    because of the other broken layers (KMS grants, handler bug, Lambda
#    resource policy).
log "attaching rotation config (temp Lambda permission)"
FUNCTION_ARN="arn:aws:lambda:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:function:${FUNCTION}"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

if aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
     --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
     --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
     --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 \
     --no-rotate-immediately >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (no immediate trigger)"
elif aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
       --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
       --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
       --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (first run may have fired)"
else
  log "rotate-secret failed even with temp permission , check LocalStack compat"
fi

# Strip the temp permission so the agent still has to add it.
aws lambda remove-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

log "done"

[stdout]
handler.py
setup.sh
starter
#!/bin/bash
# Seeds LocalStack with the broken-by-design state the agent inherits:
#   - customer-managed KMS CMK (alias alias/app-rotation-key)
#   - Secrets Manager secret encrypted with that CMK
#   - IAM role for the rotation Lambda (with deliberately incomplete policy)
#   - Rotation Lambda (with a subtle bug in finishSecret)
#   - Rotation configured on the secret, pointing at the Lambda
#
# The task expects these resources to already exist when the agent starts
# working. The agent must find the bugs and make `rotate-secret` actually
# advance AWSCURRENT end-to-end.

set -euo pipefail

REGION="${AWS_DEFAULT_REGION:-us-east-1}"
ACCOUNT_ID="000000000000"
SECRET_NAME="app/db/password"
ROLE_NAME="secrets-rotator-role"
FUNCTION="secrets-rotator"
KEY_ALIAS="alias/app-rotation-key"

log() { echo "[setup] $*" >&2; }

log "waiting for localstack health..."
for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  if curl -sf http://localstack:4566/_localstack/health | grep -q '"secretsmanager": "available"'; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 2
done

# 1. CMK with a minimal key policy (root admin only , no grant for the
#    rotation Lambda role yet).
log "creating KMS CMK"
KEY_POLICY=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::${ACCOUNT_ID}:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
KEY_ID=$(aws kms create-key \
  --description "Customer CMK for app/db/password" \
  --key-usage ENCRYPT_DECRYPT \
  --policy "$KEY_POLICY" \
  --query 'KeyMetadata.KeyId' --output text)
aws kms create-alias --alias-name "$KEY_ALIAS" --target-key-id "$KEY_ID" >/dev/null
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:key/${KEY_ID}"
log "created CMK $KEY_ID"

# 2. Secret, encrypted with the CMK.
log "creating secret"
aws secretsmanager create-secret \
  --name "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --kms-key-id "$KEY_ARN" \
  --secret-string '{"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}' \
  --description "App DB password, rotated by Lambda" >/dev/null

SECRET_ARN=$(aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
  --query 'ARN' --output text)
log "created secret $SECRET_ARN"

# 3. IAM role for the rotation Lambda. Deliberately incomplete , has
#    secretsmanager:* but no KMS actions. The broken state the agent
#    inherits.
log "creating rotation Lambda role"
TRUST=$(cat <<'JSON'
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Effect": "Allow", "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"}, "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"}
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam create-role \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --assume-role-policy-document "$TRUST" >/dev/null

aws iam attach-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole

INLINE=$(cat <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    }
  ]
}
JSON
)
aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document "$INLINE"

ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name "$ROLE_NAME" --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)
log "created role $ROLE_ARN"

# 4. Package + deploy the rotation Lambda (with its buggy handler).
log "packaging rotation Lambda"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cp /app/handler.py "${WORKDIR}/handler.py"
(cd "$WORKDIR" && zip -q handler.zip handler.py)

aws lambda create-function \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --runtime python3.11 \
  --role "$ROLE_ARN" \
  --handler handler.lambda_handler \
  --timeout 30 \
  --memory-size 256 \
  --environment "Variables={SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT=http://localstack:4566}" \
  --zip-file "fileb://${WORKDIR}/handler.zip" >/dev/null

for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
    --query 'Configuration.State' --output text 2>/dev/null || echo "Pending")
  [ "$STATE" = "Active" ] && break
  sleep 1
done
log "Lambda $FUNCTION active"

# NOTE: deliberately NOT calling `aws lambda add-permission` with
# principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com. The agent must add that.

# 5. Attach rotation config on the secret. Secrets Manager refuses to
#    attach unless the rotation Lambda already grants it InvokeFunction,
#    so we temporarily add that permission, attach rotation, then remove
#    the permission so the agent still has to re-add it as part of their
#    fix. Net result: RotationEnabled=true but rotation fails at runtime
#    because of the other broken layers (KMS grants, handler bug, Lambda
#    resource policy).
log "attaching rotation config (temp Lambda permission)"
FUNCTION_ARN="arn:aws:lambda:${REGION}:${ACCOUNT_ID}:function:${FUNCTION}"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

if aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
     --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
     --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
     --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 \
     --no-rotate-immediately >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (no immediate trigger)"
elif aws secretsmanager rotate-secret \
       --secret-id "$SECRET_NAME" \
       --rotation-lambda-arn "$FUNCTION_ARN" \
       --rotation-rules AutomaticallyAfterDays=30 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
  log "rotation attached (first run may have fired)"
else
  log "rotate-secret failed even with temp permission , check LocalStack compat"
fi

# Strip the temp permission so the agent still has to add it.
aws lambda remove-permission \
  --function-name "$FUNCTION" \
  --statement-id TempRotationSetup >/dev/null 2>&1 || true

log "done"

/app/handler.py

contents
1	# Rotation Lambda for AWS Secrets Manager, "single-user" pattern
2	# (no external database, value is self-contained).
3	#
4	# Secrets Manager calls this function 4 times in sequence per rotation,
5	# passing a Step field: createSecret, setSecret, testSecret, finishSecret.
6	# Each step must return cleanly for the rotation to advance.
7	#
8	# Reference:
9	#   https://docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager/latest/userguide/rotate-secrets_lambda-functions.html
10	
11	import json
12	import logging
13	import os
14	
15	import boto3
16	
17	logger = logging.getLogger()
18	logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)
19	
20	ENDPOINT = os.environ.get("SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT") or os.environ.get(
21	    "AWS_ENDPOINT_URL"
22	)
23	
24	
25	def _client():
26	    return boto3.client("secretsmanager", endpoint_url=ENDPOINT) if ENDPOINT else boto3.client("secretsmanager")
27	
28	
29	def lambda_handler(event, context):
30	    arn = event["SecretId"]
31	    token = event["ClientRequestToken"]
32	    step = event["Step"]
33	
34	    client = _client()
35	
36	    desc = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
37	    if not desc.get("RotationEnabled"):
38	        logger.error("Secret %s is not enabled for rotation", arn)
39	        raise ValueError(f"Secret {arn} is not enabled for rotation")
40	
41	    versions = desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {})
42	    if token not in versions:
43	        logger.error("Secret version %s has no stage for rotation of %s", token, arn)
44	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} has no stage for rotation of secret {arn}")
45	    if "AWSCURRENT" in versions[token]:
46	        logger.info("Secret version %s already AWSCURRENT for %s", token, arn)
47	        return
48	    if "AWSPENDING" not in versions[token]:
49	        logger.error("Secret version %s not staged as AWSPENDING for %s", token, arn)
50	        raise ValueError(f"Secret version {token} not set as AWSPENDING for rotation of secret {arn}")
51	
52	    if step == "createSecret":
53	        create_secret(client, arn, token)
54	    elif step == "setSecret":
55	        set_secret(client, arn, token)
56	    elif step == "testSecret":
57	        test_secret(client, arn, token)
58	    elif step == "finishSecret":
59	        finish_secret(client, arn, token)
60	    else:
61	        raise ValueError(f"Invalid step parameter: {step}")
62	
63	
64	def create_secret(client, arn, token):
65	    # Generate a new candidate value and stash it as AWSPENDING.
66	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
67	
68	    try:
69	        client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
70	        logger.info("createSecret: pending version %s already exists", token)
71	    except client.exceptions.ResourceNotFoundException:
72	        password = client.get_random_password(PasswordLength=32, ExcludePunctuation=True)
73	        client.put_secret_value(
74	            SecretId=arn,
75	            ClientRequestToken=token,
76	            SecretString=json.dumps({"password": password["RandomPassword"]}),
77	            VersionStages=["AWSPENDING"],
78	        )
79	        logger.info("createSecret: stored new AWSPENDING version %s", token)
80	
81	
82	def set_secret(client, arn, token):
83	    # No external system to update for a self-contained secret; validate
84	    # that both AWSCURRENT and AWSPENDING are readable and move on.
85	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionStage="AWSCURRENT")
86	    client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
87	    logger.info("setSecret: both stages readable")
88	
89	
90	def test_secret(client, arn, token):
91	    # Sanity-check the pending value parses as JSON with a non-empty
92	    # password field. Real handlers would attempt a login here.
93	    pending = client.get_secret_value(SecretId=arn, VersionId=token, VersionStage="AWSPENDING")
94	    parsed = json.loads(pending["SecretString"])
95	    if not parsed.get("password"):
96	        raise ValueError("testSecret: pending value has no password")
97	    logger.info("testSecret: pending value validated")
98	
99	
100	def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
101	    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
102	    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
103	    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
104	    # consumers keep reading the old password.
105	    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
106

Describe current secret state

shell
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password
output
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/0303fd00-db81-4329-bc07-b42a7bd58921",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:23+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:20.458000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:17:19+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:10.657577+00:00"
}

[stdout]
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "Description": "App DB password, rotated by Lambda",
    "KmsKeyId": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/0303fd00-db81-4329-bc07-b42a7bd58921",
    "RotationEnabled": true,
    "RotationLambdaARN": "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator",
    "RotationRules": {
        "AutomaticallyAfterDays": 30
    },
    "LastRotatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:23+00:00",
    "LastChangedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:20.458000+00:00",
    "LastAccessedDate": "2026-04-22T00:00:00+00:00",
    "NextRotationDate": "2026-05-22T19:17:19+00:00",
    "VersionIdsToStages": {
        "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
            "AWSCURRENT"
        ],
        "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
            "AWSPENDING"
        ]
    },
    "CreatedDate": "2026-04-22T19:17:10.657577+00:00"
}

Inspect IAM and KMS policies

shell
aws iam get-role-policy --role-name secrets-rotator-role --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy && echo "---" && aws kms get-key-policy --key-id arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/0303fd00-db81-4329-bc07-b42a7bd58921 --policy-name default
output
{
    "RoleName": "secrets-rotator-role",
    "PolicyName": "SecretsRotatorPolicy",
    "PolicyDocument": {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                    "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
                "Resource": "*"
            }
        ]
    }
}
---
{
    "Policy": "{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Id\": \"app-rotation-key-policy\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"EnableRootAdmin\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\",\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    }\n  ]\n}"
}

[stdout]
{
    "RoleName": "secrets-rotator-role",
    "PolicyName": "SecretsRotatorPolicy",
    "PolicyDocument": {
        "Version": "2012-10-17",
        "Statement": [
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": [
                    "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
                    "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
                    "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
                ],
                "Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP"
            },
            {
                "Effect": "Allow",
                "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
                "Resource": "*"
            }
        ]
    }
}
---
{
    "Policy": "{\n  \"Version\": \"2012-10-17\",\n  \"Id\": \"app-rotation-key-policy\",\n  \"Statement\": [\n    {\n      \"Sid\": \"EnableRootAdmin\",\n      \"Effect\": \"Allow\",\n      \"Principal\": { \"AWS\": \"arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root\" },\n      \"Action\": \"kms:*\",\n      \"Resource\": \"*\"\n    }\n  ]\n}"
}

Check Lambda resource policy

shell
aws lambda get-policy --function-name secrets-rotator 2>&1
output
Exit code 254

aws: [ERROR]: An error occurred (ResourceNotFoundException) when calling the GetPolicy operation: The resource you requested does not exist.

Additional error details:
Type: User

[error] tool reported failure
Found the four broken layers: (1) handler `finish_secret` is a no-op, (2) IAM role has no KMS permissions, (3) KMS key policy only allows root, (4) Lambda has no resource policy allowing `secretsmanager.amazonaws.com` to invoke it. Let me fix each.

/app/handler.py

− removed
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    # TODO: promote the AWSPENDING version to AWSCURRENT here.
    # Without this, rotation will appear to succeed from Secrets
    # Manager's orchestrator but AWSCURRENT never advances and
    # consumers keep reading the old password.
    logger.info("finishSecret: (no-op)")
+ added
def finish_secret(client, arn, token):
    desc = client.describe_secret(SecretId=arn)
    current_version = None
    for version_id, stages in desc.get("VersionIdsToStages", {}).items():
        if "AWSCURRENT" in stages:
            if version_id == token:
                logger.info("finishSecret: version %s already AWSCURRENT", token)
                return
            current_version = version_id
            break

    client.update_secret_version_stage(
        SecretId=arn,
        VersionStage="AWSCURRENT",
        MoveToVersionId=token,
        RemoveFromVersionId=current_version,
    )
    logger.info("finishSecret: promoted %s to AWSCURRENT (was %s)", token, current_version)

Repackage and deploy the fixed Lambda

shell
cd /tmp && rm -f handler.zip && cp /app/handler.py . && zip -q handler.zip handler.py && aws lambda update-function-code --function-name secrets-rotator --zip-file fileb:///tmp/handler.zip --query 'LastUpdateStatus' --output text
output
InProgress
Shell cwd was reset to /app

[stdout]
InProgress
[stderr]

Shell cwd was reset to /app

Wait for Lambda code update to complete

shell
for _ in $(seq 1 20); do STATE=$(aws lambda get-function --function-name secrets-rotator --query 'Configuration.LastUpdateStatus' --output text); if [ "$STATE" = "Successful" ]; then echo "ready"; break; fi; sleep 1; done
output
ready

[stdout]
ready
Now update the IAM role to add KMS permissions (least-privilege, scoped via `kms:ViaService`), update the KMS key policy to let the role use it, and add the Lambda invoke permission for Secrets Manager.

Update IAM role with scoped KMS permissions

shell
SECRET_ARN="arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP"
KEY_ARN="arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:000000000000:key/0303fd00-db81-4329-bc07-b42a7bd58921"

cat > /tmp/inline.json <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "secretsmanager:DescribeSecret",
        "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
        "secretsmanager:UpdateSecretVersionStage"
      ],
      "Resource": "${SECRET_ARN}"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": "secretsmanager:GetRandomPassword",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "${KEY_ARN}",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "kms:ViaService": "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
JSON

aws iam put-role-policy \
  --role-name secrets-rotator-role \
  --policy-name SecretsRotatorPolicy \
  --policy-document file:///tmp/inline.json && echo "IAM updated"
output
IAM updated

[stdout]
IAM updated

Grant rotation role access on the CMK

shell
KEY_ID="0303fd00-db81-4329-bc07-b42a7bd58921"
ROLE_ARN=$(aws iam get-role --role-name secrets-rotator-role --query 'Role.Arn' --output text)

cat > /tmp/keypolicy.json <<JSON
{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Id": "app-rotation-key-policy",
  "Statement": [
    {
      "Sid": "EnableRootAdmin",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "arn:aws:iam::000000000000:root" },
      "Action": "kms:*",
      "Resource": "*"
    },
    {
      "Sid": "AllowRotationLambdaUseViaSecretsManager",
      "Effect": "Allow",
      "Principal": { "AWS": "${ROLE_ARN}" },
      "Action": [
        "kms:Decrypt",
        "kms:GenerateDataKey"
      ],
      "Resource": "*",
      "Condition": {
        "StringEquals": {
          "kms:ViaService": "secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com"
        }
      }
    }
  ]
}
JSON

aws kms put-key-policy \
  --key-id "$KEY_ID" \
  --policy-name default \
  --policy file:///tmp/keypolicy.json && echo "KMS key policy updated"
output
KMS key policy updated

[stdout]
KMS key policy updated

Allow Secrets Manager to invoke the Lambda

shell
SECRET_ARN="arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP"
aws lambda add-permission \
  --function-name secrets-rotator \
  --statement-id SecretsManagerInvoke \
  --action lambda:InvokeFunction \
  --principal secretsmanager.amazonaws.com \
  --source-arn "$SECRET_ARN"
output
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP\"}}}"
}

[stdout]
{
    "Statement": "{\"Sid\": \"SecretsManagerInvoke\", \"Effect\": \"Allow\", \"Action\": \"lambda:InvokeFunction\", \"Resource\": \"arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:000000000000:function:secrets-rotator\", \"Principal\": {\"Service\": \"secretsmanager.amazonaws.com\"}, \"Condition\": {\"ArnLike\": {\"AWS:SourceArn\": \"arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP\"}}}"
}
Now let me run rotation and verify AWSCURRENT actually advances.

Rotate and verify the secret advanced

shell
echo "=== Before rotation ==="
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages'
BEFORE_CURRENT=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionId' --output text)
BEFORE_STRING=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "BEFORE VersionId: $BEFORE_CURRENT"
echo "BEFORE SecretString: $BEFORE_STRING"

echo ""
echo "=== Triggering rotation ==="
aws secretsmanager rotate-secret --secret-id app/db/password

echo ""
echo "=== Waiting for rotation to complete ==="
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
  AFTER_CURRENT=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionId' --output text)
  if [ "$AFTER_CURRENT" != "$BEFORE_CURRENT" ]; then
    echo "Advanced after poll"
    break
  fi
  sleep 2
done

echo ""
echo "=== After rotation ==="
aws secretsmanager describe-secret --secret-id app/db/password --query 'VersionIdsToStages'
AFTER_STRING=$(aws secretsmanager get-secret-value --secret-id app/db/password --query 'SecretString' --output text)
echo "AFTER VersionId: $AFTER_CURRENT"
echo "AFTER SecretString: $AFTER_STRING"

echo ""
if [ "$BEFORE_CURRENT" != "$AFTER_CURRENT" ] && [ "$BEFORE_STRING" != "$AFTER_STRING" ]; then
  echo "SUCCESS: AWSCURRENT advanced to new version with new value"
else
  echo "FAILURE: AWSCURRENT did not advance"
fi
output
=== Before rotation ===
{
    "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
        "AWSPENDING"
    ]
}
BEFORE VersionId: 3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2
BEFORE SecretString: {"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}

=== Triggering rotation ===
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f"
}

=== Waiting for rotation to complete ===
Advanced after poll

=== After rotation ===
{
    "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
        "AWSPENDING",
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
AFTER VersionId: 7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f
AFTER SecretString: {"password": "otUpSu448pFHZy7Tz0Xlbd8DdDYw5sG8"}

SUCCESS: AWSCURRENT advanced to new version with new value

[stdout]
=== Before rotation ===
{
    "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ],
    "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
        "AWSPENDING"
    ]
}
BEFORE VersionId: 3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2
BEFORE SecretString: {"password": "initial-placeholder-value"}

=== Triggering rotation ===
{
    "ARN": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:us-east-1:000000000000:secret:app/db/password-lhAfDP",
    "Name": "app/db/password",
    "VersionId": "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f"
}

=== Waiting for rotation to complete ===
Advanced after poll

=== After rotation ===
{
    "3df05c1a-7193-4dc2-8357-77320b462bb2": [
        "AWSPREVIOUS"
    ],
    "7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f": [
        "AWSPENDING",
        "AWSCURRENT"
    ]
}
AFTER VersionId: 7ef00cbd-12ab-4e50-8ef9-3feb9e8ad57f
AFTER SecretString: {"password": "otUpSu448pFHZy7Tz0Xlbd8DdDYw5sG8"}

SUCCESS: AWSCURRENT advanced to new version with new value
Rotation works end-to-end. `AWSCURRENT` moved from `3df05c1a…` → `7ef00cbd…`, the secret string changed to a freshly generated password, and the prior version now holds `AWSPREVIOUS`. The four broken layers and their fixes: 1. **`finish_secret` was a no-op** (`/app/handler.py:100`) , now calls `update_secret_version_stage` to move `AWSCURRENT` from the old version to the AWSPENDING token. 2. **IAM role missing KMS actions** , added `kms:Decrypt` + `kms:GenerateDataKey` scoped to the specific CMK with `kms:ViaService = secretsmanager.us-east-1.amazonaws.com` for least-privilege. 3. **KMS key policy only allowed root** , added a statement granting the rotation role `Decrypt`/`GenerateDataKey` with the same `kms:ViaService` condition. 4. **Lambda had no resource policy** , added `lambda:InvokeFunction` for `secretsmanager.amazonaws.com` with the secret ARN as `SourceArn`.
Final diff , what the agent changed

No file changes, the agent left the workspace untouched.

Verifier output , the proof behind the reward
tests/test.sh
============================= test session starts ==============================
platform linux -- Python 3.12.3, pytest-8.4.1, pluggy-1.6.0 -- /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/MiJCDyEwJmdnozfBST5q8/bin/python
cachedir: .pytest_cache
rootdir: /tests
plugins: json-ctrf-0.3.5
collecting ... collected 8 items

../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real PASSED             [ 12%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable PASSED               [ 25%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk PASSED [ 37%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists PASSED             [ 50%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions PASSED     [ 62%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role PASSED  [ 75%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke PASSED [ 87%]
../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent PASSED  [100%]

=============================== warnings summary ===============================
test_outputs.py: 14 warnings
  /root/.cache/uv/archive-v0/MiJCDyEwJmdnozfBST5q8/lib/python3.12/site-packages/botocore/auth.py:424: DeprecationWarning: datetime.datetime.utcnow() is deprecated and scheduled for removal in a future version. Use timezone-aware objects to represent datetimes in UTC: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.UTC).
    datetime_now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()

-- Docs: https://docs.pytest.org/en/stable/how-to/capture-warnings.html
==================================== PASSES ====================================
=========================== short test summary info ============================
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_aws_cli_binary_is_real
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_localstack_reachable
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_secret_exists_and_uses_customer_cmk
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotation_lambda_exists
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_role_policy_grants_kms_actions
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_kms_key_policy_grants_lambda_role
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_lambda_permission_allows_secretsmanager_invoke
PASSED ../tests/test_outputs.py::test_rotate_secret_advances_awscurrent
======================== 8 passed, 14 warnings in 5.88s ========================

Reproduce this trial: git checkout 2f94510 && PYTHONPATH=src python3 scripts/build_site.py , then open trial/trial_b81b43fa3e284a2a. Re-running the agent live requires EVAL_PLATFORM_ENABLE_OAUTH_SMOKE=1 and is non-deterministic.

Trial trial_b81b43fa3e284a2a · verifier authoritative; classifier explanatory.